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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to evaluate the impact of taxes and state ownership on the market value of
dividends in the Vietnamese stock market. The market value of dividends is measured by the
ex-day drop-off ratio which is the ratio of the stock price drop on the ex-dividend day to the
amount of dividend. First, the thesis examines how the ex-day drop-off ratio of stocks on the
Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) changes following the changes in the relative difference
between the tax rate on dividends and on capital gains. The thesis finds that, on average, the exday drop-off ratios are not responsive to the changes in dividends and capital gains tax rate.
This finding is inconsistent with the tax hypothesis which predicts the tax differential treatment
between dividends and capital gains to be the driving force of the ex-day stock price behaviour.
On the other hand, the thesis documents evidence in support of the short-term trading
hypothesis. Abnormal trading volume present around the ex-days is adversely affected by
transaction costs and dividend yields but unaffected by the difference between dividends and
capital gains tax rate. Secondly, the thesis examines the relationship between the value of
dividends and state ownership. A positive correlation between the ex-day drop-off ratios and
state ownership indicates that the market value of dividends is higher in companies with a
higher level of state ownership. Finally, the thesis finds that the impact on the market value of
dividends of the tax differential between dividends and capital gains is significant for
companies with state ownership greater than 50 percent. For companies with state ownership
less than 50 percent, the difference between dividends and capital gains tax rates does not
significantly affect the market value of dividends.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Motivation and Objectives of the Thesis
There has been a vast amount of research on ex-day price and trading behaviour.1
Such research offers several important implications. Elton and Gruber (1970) and
Miller and Scholes (1982) argue that investigating ex-day prices helps to identify
marginal investors from which to evaluate the relationship between dividend yield
and stock return. The subsequent ex-dividend studies highlight several factors that
can affect the ex-day price and volume behaviour. These include the differential tax
treatment between dividends and capital gains (Elton and Gruber, 1970),
transaction costs and risks (Kalay, 1982), investors’ tax heterogeneity (Michaely
and Vila, 1995) or market microstructure elements such as bid-ask bounces and tick
size (Bali and Hite, 1998; Frank and Jagannathan, 1998).

The level of drop in stock price on the ex-dividend day has been used widely as an
indicator of the market value of dividends in the ex-dividend studies. With the
frictionless absence of transaction costs and taxes, stock price on the ex-dividend
day is expected to drop by the amount of dividend (Miller and Modigliani, 1961).
Nonetheless, it is well documented that the ex-day stock price drops by less than
the dividend amount. For example, a mean drop-off ratio of 0.78 for listed

1

Ex-dividend day, or ex-day, is the day on which buyers of the stock are not entitled to the next
dividend payment.

1

companies in the US market is reported by Elton and Gruber (1970) who argue that
the ex-day price drop by less than the amount of dividend is a reflection of the
penalty for a heavier tax burden on dividends than on capital gains (the tax
hypothesis). Since then, the tax hypothesis is challenged by the short-term trading
hypothesis. Kalay (1982) argues that short-term traders who face no tax difference
between dividends and capital gains would arbitrage away any positive return on
the ex-day. The implication is that the ex-day price behaviour may not be solely
determined by the difference in dividends and capital gains tax but also by other
factors such as transaction costs and risk exposure (Kalay, 1982; Lakonishok and
Vermaelen, 1986; Karpoff and Walkling, 1988; Boyd and Jagannathan, 1998).
More recently, market microstructure explanations emerge to incorporate bid-ask
bounce and price discreteness in explaining the phenomenon of ex-day price dropoff different from unity (Dubofsky, 1992; Bali and Hite, 1998; Frank and
Jagannathan, 1998). Despite considerable research efforts, the debate on the ex-day
price behaviour and varying explanations for different markets are still continuing
(Al Yahyaee et al., 2008). Moreover, the requirement for further research to better
understand the impact of taxes on the ex-day price behaviour is still substantial
(Francis et al., 2012).

The primary purpose of this research is to examine how the market value of
dividends in the Vietnamese stock market is affected by the differential tax
treatment on dividends and on capital gains. Many complexities and ambiguities
inherent in data used by previous studies on ex-day price behaviour are resolved in
this research. First, the tax structure in Vietnam is much simpler than that in the US,
UK or Australia. There is no need to identify the marginal tax rate since a flat tax
2

rate is applied to both dividends and capital gains which contributes to relieving the
complexity involved in testing the tax hypothesis. Furthermore, examining
legislative changes which only affect the differential tax treatment between
dividends and capital gains allows tax-explanations for ex-day behaviour to be more
reliable. As Lasfer (1995) argues, studying ex-day stock price change that follows
regulatory changes is advantageous because it can isolate the interaction effect
among taxes, transaction costs and risks on stock price. There are three key changes
to tax legislations during the sample period from January 2006 to December 2012
in Vietnam which result in three distinct sub-periods with varying levels of
dividends and capital gains tax. Prior to 30 June 2010, there was no tax on either
dividends or capital gains. The Law on Personal Income Tax 2007 stipulated a
dividends tax rate of five percent and a capital gains tax rate of 20 percent which
applied to dividends received and capital gains realised after 1 July 2010. From 1
August 2011, the tax on dividends was removed and the tax rate on capital gains
was reduced by half to 10 percent. Consequently, examining the variations in the
ex-day drop-off ratios in the three sub-periods is expected to provide insights into
how the dividend value changes in response to a change in the relative difference
between dividends and capital gains tax rate.
This study also aims to detect the presence of short-term trading around the ex-days
in the Vietnamese market since short-term trading has been attributed to negate the
impact of taxes on the ex-day price behaviour (Kalay, 1982). The presence of
investors trading around the ex-days for dividend related purposes would lead to
abnormal trading volumes around the ex-days. The question as to whether investors
engage in dividend avoidance or dividend capture trading is examined using
abnormal return analysis around the ex-days. The positive abnormal return is
3

expected to be associated with buying pressure caused by an increase in demand
while the negative abnormal return is most likely to be the result of selling pressure
(Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986; Lasfer, 1995).

Finally, the thesis investigates how ownership structure influences the market value
of dividends. As an emerging market, ownership structure is a critical issue in
Vietnam (Phung and Hoang, 2013). The focus of this study is on whether the market
value of dividend of a company is affected by the level of state ownership. Although
the number of state-owned enterprises has decreased significantly since the
beginning of the equitisation process in 1992, Vietnamese companies are still
characterised by a high level of state ownership (Sjoholm, 2006; Truong, 2007; Vo,
2013; Phung and Hoang, 2013).

Using the data of dividend-paying firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange,
the research attempts to address the following questions:
1. How is the market value of dividends affected by the differential tax treatment
between dividends and capital gains?
2. Does short-term trading play a role in explaining the impact of the differential
tax treatment between dividends and capital gains on the market value of
dividends?
3. How is the market value of dividends affected by the level of state ownership?
1.2. Contributions
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing insights into the market
value of dividends and trading patterns around the ex-dividend day in an
4

institutional setting that is distinguished from the previously investigated markets.
Traditionally, it has been witnessed that dividends tax rate is higher than capital
gains tax rate (e.g. US, UK, Australia) or is equal to capital gains tax rate (e.g. Hong
Kong, Oman). The drop-off ratios in these markets are found to be consistently less
than one which indicates that dividends are discounted by investors relative to
capital gains. In contrast, the tax rate on dividends in Vietnam has never been higher
than the tax rate on capital gains. This provides a unique opportunity to test if
dividends can ever be valued by investors more than its nominal value under the
classical tax system. Moreover, the study also makes a contribution to the relevant
literature by examining the relation between ownership structure and the market
value of dividends. Even after the equitisation process in Vietnam which started in
1992, the State remains as a controlling shareholder in most equitised firms
(Truong, 2007; Vo, 2013). This study provides evidence on how the level of state
ownership as an internal factor affects the market value of dividends.

This study has several practical implications. First, corporate managers can be
informed of how their dividends are valued against capital gains in the market under
a different tax regime; for instance, would dividends be more or less valuable for
investors when the gap between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate is
wider? Results of the current research would also help corporate executives
understand whether ownership structure affects the value of dividends perceived by
investors. Collectively, such knowledge helps corporate managers better
understand how dividend policy affects the firm value which would assist them in
determining the optimal dividend policy. Moreover, the identification of a shortterm trading pattern and the existence of abnormal return would open ways for
5

investors to create a profitable trading strategy (Graham et al., 2007). For instance,
if abnormal return is positive before the ex-day, investors might consider buying
the stock before the level of abnormal return increases and sell afterward. The
presence of profit opportunities would not necessarily guarantee the realization of
abnormal returns as transactions around ex-dividend days are not without risk and
abnormal returns also depend on firm-specific characteristics (Grammatikos, 1989).
Finally, the analysis of abnormal returns and the level of state ownership would
allow investors to understand whether abnormal returns are affected by the presence
of the State as a shareholder.

1.3. Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter reviews theoretical and empirical literature relevant to the ex-dividend
price and volume behaviour. The previous literature on the relation between
ownership structure and dividend policy is also reviewed.
Chapter 3: Institutional Settings of the Vietnamese Market
This chapter presents the institutional features of the Vietnamese market. It reviews
the equitisation process in Vietnam to emphasise the importance of incorporating
state ownership to the study in examining the impact of taxes on the market value
of dividends. The chapter then discusses the development process of the stock
market in Vietnam and the mechanism under which stocks are traded. Also included
in the chapter is the discussion on dividend policies of Vietnamese listed
companies. Finally, the chapter highlights the uniqueness of the tax condition in
Vietnam.
6

Chapter 4: Hypotheses, Data and Methods
This chapter develops a set of hypotheses to be tested in this thesis based on the
existing literature and the relevant market conditions in Vietnam. The chapter then
discusses data and methods used to test the hypotheses.
Chapter 5: Empirical Findings
This chapter first presents univariate and regression results on ex-day drop-off
ratios, abnormal returns and abnormal volumes. The chapter next discusses how the
results lead to the acceptance or rejection of each hypothesis proposed in Chapter
4. Finally, based on hypothesis testing results, the chapter concludes about the
impact of taxes and state ownership on the market value of dividends and how state
ownership acts as a moderating factor in explaining the impact of taxes on the
market value of dividends.
Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions
This chapter provides a summary of each chapter which includes the discussion of
the key findings. The chapter then discusses the practical implications of the
research for board of directors, regulators and investors. Finally, the chapter
outlines limitations inherent in the study and provides several avenues for future
research.

7

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents a theoretical framework where the concept of dividend value
is derived. Section 2.1 discusses different theories about the effects of dividend
policies on the firm’s value. Followed in section 2.2 to 2.5 are a series of hypotheses
proposing different explanations to the factors that affect the market value of
dividends. Each hypothesis is complemented by empirical studies. Included in
section 2.6 is the literature review on the relation between ownership structure and
dividend policy which provides indirect evidence on how the market value of
dividends might be affected by ownership structure of the firm.
2.1. Dividend Policy and the Firm’s Value
Miller and Modigliani (referred hereinafter as M&M) (1961) published their
seminal paper to argue that a firm’s dividend policy has no effect on the firm’s
value. M&M’s basic argument is that a firm’s share price is determined by the
shareholder’s expectation of the firm’s future prospect which, in turn, depends on
its earning generating ability and investment decisions. They propose that the way
a company distributes its earnings through its dividend policy is not relevant to how
the shareholders perceive the firm’s value. M&M’s proposition is made based on
certain assumptions about market perfection such as no taxes, no transaction costs,
no information asymmetry, and no agency costs. Since the theory’s introduction in
1961, a number of empirical studies have been conducted to test its validity but not
without problems due to the theory’s complicated assumptions (Ball et al., 1979).
8

Black and Scholes (1974) document the result which supports M&M’s dividend
irrelevance theory in that they find no difference in the expected return of highyield and low-yield stocks. This result suggests that investors do not perceive
dividend policy to be important in determining a firm’s value. Before the
introduction of the dividend irrelevance theory, the common belief among market
participants was also that dividend policy would not affect dividend value;
therefore, stock prices on the ex-dividend days should drop by approximately the
amount of dividends (Campbell and Beraneck, 1955). The assumptions made by
M&M, however, are unrealistic since no market would be able to realise such
perfections; therefore, it is challenging to prove the reliability of their argument.
Their conclusion would make sense if shareholders’ expectations depend solely on
the present value of the firm’s future free cash flows (Ross, 2009) while, in fact,
shareholders’ expectation also varies with other factors such as new information
release.

The bird-in-the-hand hypothesis is different from M&M’s theory in that it suggests
that dividend policy affects the firm’s value. Graham and Dodd (1951) are among
the first scholars who make arguments in favour of high dividend payout.2 Under
the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis, investors prefer dividends which are a certainty to
fluctuating capital gains. A high level of dividend also reduces agency problems
since financial managers will have less cash to make unnecessary investments. For
these reasons, a higher level of dividend is expected to be associated with a higher

Graham, B. & Dodd, D. (1951) ‘It is now becoming standard practice to evaluate common stock
by applying one multiplier to that portion of earnings paid in dividends and a much smaller multiplier
to the undistributed balance’. Security Analysis: Principles and Techniques, McGraw-Hill, New
York, pp.432.
2

9

firm value. This hypothesis was critically challenged by M&M (1961) when they
argued that the way a firm distributed its earnings did not affect its ability to
generate future cash flow and the firm value. Al-Malkawi et al. (2010) report that
up to date, there has been little support, both in terms of theoretical and empirical
research, for the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis.

One alternative and opposing view to the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis is the tax
preference theory. Allowing taxes to exist, the tax preference theory argues that the
dividends and capital gains tax differential drives investors to demand dividends
differently. According to the tax preference theory, if dividends are taxed at a higher
rate than capital gains, then people will prefer stocks that pay low dividends and
vice versa. Even in cases where dividends and capital gains are taxed equally,
capital gains are preferred due to their deferral of tax payment until realised.
Researchers have consistently found evidence to support this view that capital gains
are preferred to dividends when they observe stock prices on the ex-day decline by
less than the amount of dividends [see Campbell and Beraneck (1955); Elton and
Gruber (1970); Kalay (1982)]. The explanations as to why dividend value is
discounted against capital gains, however, are not confined to the relative difference
between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. The sections that follow
discuss various hypotheses that attempt to explain how dividends are valued against
capital gains.
2.2. Tax Hypothesis
Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that the market will set the equilibrium price on the
ex-day so that a marginal investor is indifferent between selling before or on the ex10

day. In this way, the marginal investor is assumed to be a long-term investor.
Denote the stock price on the cum-day and on the ex-day by Pcum and Pex
respectively. P0 is the initial purchase price. If the investor sells the stock before it
goes ex-dividend, he will forgo the dividend to the buyer. In this case, his income
is in the form of capital gains after taking capital gains tax into account at the capital
gains tax rate of tg. The resulting income can be expressed as:

Pcum – ( Pcum – P0 )  t g
If instead he decides to sell the stock on the ex-day, his income will be sourced from
both dividends and capital gains. If dividends are taxed at the rate of td, his total
income after taxes is:

Pex – ( Pex – P0 )  t g + D  ( 1 – td )
In equilibrium:

Pcum – ( Pcum – P0 )  t g = Pex – ( Pex – P0 )  t g + D  ( 1 – td )
Pcum – Pcum  t g + P0  t g = Pex – Pex  t g + P0  t g + D  ( 1 – td )
Pcum  ( 1 – t g ) = Pex  ( 1 – t g ) + D  ( 1 – td )
( Pcum – Pex )( 1 – t g ) = D  ( 1 – td )
Pcum  Pex 1  td
=
1  tg
D

(1)

The left hand side of equation (1) is called the drop-off ratio or ex-day premium.
Equation (1) shows that the different-from-dividend ex-day price drop is due to the
differential tax treatment between dividends and capital gains. Equation (1) also
11

indicates that if investors in the low tax bracket hold high-yield stock, its right-hand
side increases. The left-hand side, therefore, should be high. In other words, if the
dividend tax clientele exists, there should be a positive relation between dividend
yield and drop-off ratio. Elton and Gruber also argue that equation (1) can be used
to infer the marginal shareholder’s tax rate. In fact, Elton and Gruber find that the
mean drop-off ratio from stocks listed on the NYSE from 1966 to 1970 is 0.78.
They attribute this smaller-than-one drop-off ratio to the higher dividends tax rate
than capital gains tax rate in the US market. They also document that drop-off ratio
and dividend yield are positively correlated.
Several empirical studies provide evidence in support of the tax hypothesis. Barclay
(1987) reports the ex-day stock price to fall by the full amount of dividend prior to
the adoption of income tax in the US. In examining the Swedish lottery bond market
where cash distributions are tax advantaged compared to capital gains, Green and
Rydqvist (1999) also report evidence consistent with the tax-based explanation of
the ex-day price behaviour. They find the mean drop-off ratio of mixed bonds and
sequenced bonds to be 1.1 and 1.3 respectively. Similar to the argument by Elton
and Gruber (1970), Green and Rydqvist (1999) conclude that the differential tax
treatment on dividend income and capital gains drives the bond prices on the exdividend days.
Milonas et al. (2006) study both non-taxable and taxable shares in the Chinese
market. For non-taxable shares, they find that the stock price drop on the exdividend day is not statistically different from the amount of dividend. For taxable
stocks, how much stock price falls on the ex-day is found to be strictly determined
by the effective tax rate on dividends. At one extreme where dividends and capital
12

gains are equally taxed, stock price on the ex-day is found to decline by the full
amount of dividend. At the other extreme where dividends are tax-advantaged
relative to capital gains, the ex-day price drop is significantly higher than the
dividend amount. The overall results in Milonas et al. (2006) are supportive of the
tax-based explanation for the ex-day price behaviour.

Studies testing the tax hypothesis have also examined ex-day price behaviour preand post-tax legislative changes. As argued by Lasfer (1995), observing ex-day
price behaviour pre- and post-tax legislative changes helps to separate the impact
of tax from other confounding effects. Barclay (1987) finds that, prior to 1913 when
the Income Tax was adopted in the US, the ex-day drop-off ratio was equal to one.
When the dividends tax rate became higher than the capital gains tax rate in 1913,
the price drop on the ex-day was significantly less than the dividend amount. This
US evidence supports the tax-based argument by Elton and Gruber (1970). In a
similar manner, using data of listed firms on the London Stock Exchange for the
period from 6 April 1985 to 5 April 1994, Lasfer (1995) provides evidence to
support the tax hypothesis in the UK. With the introduction of the 1988 UK Income
and Corporation Taxes Act (ICTA), which significantly reduced the gap between
dividends and capital gains tax rate, he reports that the post-1988 ex-day drop-off
ratios were higher than the pre-1988 drop-off ratios.3 Lasfer argues that an increase
in the post-1988 ex-day drop-off ratios was caused by the availability of tax credits
attached to dividends resulting from the ICTA.

3

ICTA eliminated all income (including dividend) tax rates above 40 percent and required capital
gains to be taxed at the highest income tax rate of the taxpayer.
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Using Elton and Gruber’s proposition and approach, Bell and Jenkinson (2002)
examine the impact of a tax reform in the UK in 1997 on the valuation of dividend.
Prior to 1997, the UK operated an imputation tax system in which investors who
received dividends from profits taxed at the corporate level were issued a tax credit.
This tax credit could be used to reduce investors’ tax liability. More interestingly,
tax-exempt investors could claim to receive their unused tax credits in cash. The
tax reform in 1997 abolished the ability of tax-exempt investors to claim tax credits,
therefore making dividends and capital gains equally valuable to tax-exempt
investors. Pension funds were the group that were most affected by this reform since
they constituted the majority of tax-exempt investors. Bell and Jenkinson (2002)
find a significant reduction in the value of dividend income after 1997 by pension
funds as evidenced by a lower drop-off ratio, particularly for high-yielding stocks.
This evidence supports the hypothesis that tax plays a key role in explaining the exday stock price behaviour in the UK market.
Lasfer and Zenonos (2003) study the ex-day stock price behaviour in four European
countries: France, Germany, Italy and the UK. They report that the ex-day returns
are positive and significant in all four countries, meaning that the ex-day stock price
falls by less than the amount of dividend. Moreover, Lasfer and Zenonos (2003)
find evidence showing that changes in the tax regime on dividends and capital gains
significantly affect the ex-day returns. They conclude that taxation is the sole
determinant of the ex-day stock price in these four European countries.

Elton, Gruber and Blake (2005) reconfirm the effect of tax on the ex-day price
behaviour in the US market by examining two mutual funds for the period 19882001. For non-taxable funds, the ex-day drop-off ratio is greater than one which
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means that ex-day prices drop by more than the amount of dividends. For taxable
mutual funds, drop-off ratio is reported to be smaller than one when dividends tax
rate is higher than capital gains tax rate. When dividends and capital gains are taxed
at the same rate, ex-day stock prices drop by the full amount of dividend. More
recently, Francis et al. (2012) compare the drop-off ratios before and after the
introduction of the imputation tax credit system in Taiwan in 1998. They find that
the new tax system designed to reduce the burden on dividends tax leads to a higher
value of dividend with a higher drop-off ratio which is consistent with the argument
by Elton and Gruber (1970).

In short, the key argument raised by the tax hypothesis is that the difference between
the tax rate on dividends and on capital gains is the major concern for investors in
valuing dividends. However, there are other previous studies that find evidence
against the tax hypothesis. Frank and Jagannathan (1998) report a drop-off ratio of
significantly less than one in the Hong Kong market for the period 1980–1993 when
no tax was imposed on dividends and capital gains. Similar to the case of Hong
Kong, Oman experienced a drop-off ratio deviating from unity which contradicts
the prediction of the tax hypothesis (Al Yahyaee et al., 2008). Michaely (1991)
studies the 1986 Tax Reform Act in the US which removed the differential tax
treatment between dividends and capital gains but finds no change in the ex-day
drop-off ratio. Using ex-day excess return as an alternative indicator of the ex-day
price behaviour, Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) challenge the tax hypothesis when
they find positive abnormal returns over the ex-dividend period for non-taxable
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stock dividends and stock splits.4 These results suggest that tax might not be the
sole determinant of the market value of dividends.
2.3. Short-term Trading Hypothesis
The tax hypothesis is challenged by researchers who believe that ex-day price
behaviour is affected by factors other than taxes. Kalay (1982) argues that the tax
effect is only applicable for long-term traders who face differential tax rate between
dividends and capital gains. Short-term traders who face no preferential tax
treatment on either dividends or capital gains would attempt to capture dividends,
and the ex-day price behaviour is then affected by factors such as transaction costs
and risk exposure. Assuming that investors are risk-neutral and that their primary
consideration is transaction cost, Kalay argues that the ex-day drop-off ratio is
within the following bounce:
1  2c

D
D
 DR  1  2c
Pcum
Pcum

in which 2c represents a round-trip cost. Based on this argument, drop-off ratio is
dependent on the level of transaction costs, which in turn depends on dividend yield.
More specifically, transaction costs are higher for low-yielding stocks (Graham et
al., 2003). By this way, short-term trading activity is predicted to be more
pronounced for high-yield stocks.

4

Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) argue that the use of the ex-day drop-off ratio suffers from
heteroskedasticity and lack of independence. To avoid these problems, they use the concept of exday abnormal return to measure the ex-day stock price behaviour. Borrowing the tax-based argument
of Elton and Gruber (1970) in the interpretation of the ex-day abnormal returns, Eades, Hess and
Kim (1984) argue that when dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, investors will
demand a tax premium on the ex-dividend day, leading the ex-day abnormal returns to be positive.
For non-taxable samples, the required tax premium of zero, is expected to yield an excess return of
zero on ex-days.
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Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) find evidence of short-term trading around the
ex-day in the US market. By examining stock prices and trading volumes of listed
firms on the NYSE from 1 January 1970 to 31 December 1981, they find stock
prices increase significantly before the ex-day and decline sharply afterward. To
control for confounding effect of ex-day factors such as transaction costs, capital
gains and dividends tax differential on ex-day transactions, Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1986) focus their study on ex-day trading volume. They find a sharp
increase in trading volume both before and after the ex-day. They also document a
negative relationship between trading volume and transaction cost and a positive
relationship between trading volume and dividend yield. The evidence provided by
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) supports Kalay’s argument that the ex-day price
behaviour is not solely a consequence of the difference between dividends tax rate
and capital gains tax rate. Consistent with the finding of Lakonishok and Vermaelen
(1986), Daunfeldt (2002) reports a positive correlation between abnormal trading
volumes and dividend yields, suggesting that short-term traders concentrate on
high-yielding stocks.

Karpoff and Walkling (1990) confirm the existence of dividend capture on the
NASDAQ for the period 1973–1985. They find a strong correlation between the
ex-day return and transaction cost, particularly for high-yielding stocks.5 The
findings of Karpoff and Walkling further complicate the interpretation of the exday price behaviour. The drop-off ratios then reflect not only the marginal
shareholder’s tax rate but also the marginal shareholder’s transaction cost.

5

Karpoff and Walkling (1990) use bid-ask spreads as a proxy for transaction costs.
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Athanassakos (1996) also provides evidence to support the short-term trading effect
in the Canadian market from 1970 to 1984. He finds that trading volumes increase
abnormally for a number of days around the ex-day. In particular, the results exhibit
buying pressure before the ex-day and selling pressure once the stock goes exdividend. For the period when transaction costs are reduced, Athanassakos
documents a significant increase in trading volume. These findings suggest that
short-term traders play a certain role in determining the stock price and volume
behaviour around the ex-day.

Studies using abnormal returns also show evidence to support the presence of shortterm trading around the ex-day. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) find positive
abnormal returns for some days before the ex-day and negative abnormal returns
once the stocks go ex-dividend. Likewise, Shaw (1991) documents positive
abnormal returns before the ex-day and negative abnormal returns on and after the
ex-day for non-taxable master limited partnership distributions. In a study by Eades
et al. (1994), high-yielding stocks experience a shift in the sign of abnormal returns
from positive before the ex-day to negative after the ex-day, while low-yielding
stocks do not exhibit such a pattern. This evidence found in Eades et al. (1994)
supports the prediction from the short-term trading hypothesis that dividend capture
activities are most likely to take place in high-yield stocks.
2.4. Tax Heterogeneity Argument
According to Michaely and Vila (1995), tax heterogeneity among investors results
from the difference in relative tax rates on dividends and capital gains for different
groups of investors. They argue that trading around the ex-dividend days reflects
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the interaction among investors with tax heterogeneity. It follows that investors who
face a higher tax on dividends than on capital gains will attempt to avoid dividends
by selling the stocks before the ex-days. On the other hand, investors who are not
subject to the differential tax treatment between dividends and capital gains are
expected to exercise dividend capture strategy by buying before the ex-days. These
two categories of investors will then trade with each other around the ex-day.
Therefore, the ex-day stock price is not solely determined by a single marginal tax
rate. To examine the effect of investors’ tax heterogeneity on ex-day trading,
Michaely and Vila (1995) study the 1986 Tax Reform which aligned tax differential
of investors. They find that trading volume decreases significantly following the
reduction in tax heterogeneity among investors. Likewise, Michaely and Murgia
(1995) report a higher abnormal volume for stocks with greater tax heterogeneity
among investors. When estimating trading volume changes using time-series
variations, Michaely and Vila (1996) also document a positive correlation between
abnormal trading volumes around the ex-days and the degree of tax heterogeneity
among investors. A few studies have provided further support to the arguments of
Michaely and Vila. Dhaliwal and Li (2006) study how abnormal trading volumes
around the ex-days are affected by the interaction between dividend yield and
institutional ownership. The dividend yield is used as an indicator of the degree to
which return is tax disadvantaged6 and institutional ownership as a proxy for the
tax heterogeneity among investors.7 They find a positive correlation between

6

Since dividends are taxed at higher rates than capital gains, the higher the dividend yield, the more
tax disadvantaged the stock return is.
7
If the level of institutional ownership is very low, then most investors are homogeneous individual
investors while if the level of institutional ownership is very high, then most investors are
homogeneous institutional investors. Therefore, in these two extreme cases, the level of investors’
tax heterogeneity is very low. Tax heterogeneity among investors will be high if institutional
ownership is somewhere in between.
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abnormal trading volumes and dividend yield. Zhang, Farrell and Brown (2008)
also find that the 2003 Tax Act in the US which removed the tax heterogeneity
among individual investors led to a decrease in abnormal trading volumes of highyield stocks around the ex-days. The tax heterogeneity argument highlights that
investors trade around the ex-days for different tax-related purposes and that as
investors’ motivation to trade decreases, the level of trading would also be reduced
as a result.
2.5. Market Microstructure Explanations
Most recent market microstructure explanations for the ex-day price behaviour
focus on price discreteness, bid-ask bounce and limit order adjustments. Dubofsky
(1992) argues that drop-off ratios deviating from unity are caused by NYSE Rule
118, AMEX Rule 132 and price discreteness. According to these rules, on the exday, open limit buy orders are lowered by the amount of cash dividend. Under the
mechanism of tick size and price discreteness, if the adjusted price is not a multiple
of the tick, it will be lowered to the next tick. Due to that, the level of the ex-day
stock price drop cannot be exactly equal to the level of dividend. Frank and
Jagannathan (1998) propose an alternative market microstructure-based
explanation for the ex-day price behaviour. In the Hong Kong stock market where
there is no tax on either dividends or capital gains, the drop-off ratio is reported to
be significantly less than one which is against the prediction of the tax hypothesis.
Frank and Jagannathan (1998) attribute this phenomenon to bid-ask bounce based
on the fact that market makers buy the stocks on the last cum-day at the bid price
and sell on the ex-day at the ask price. The ex-day drop-off ratio is therefore
sensitive to bid-ask spread. Graham et al. (2003) and Al Yahyaee et al. (2008) argue
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that the ex-day drop-off ratio should be closer to one when mid-point of bid and ask
prices are used instead of closing prices for calculation. In fact, Al Yahyaee et al.
(2008) find that the drop-off ratio calculated from closing prices is significantly less
than one in Oman where no tax is imposed on dividends and capital gains. However,
when midpoint pricing is used, the ex-day stock price is proved to drop by the full
amount of dividends. This is consistent with the argument by Frank and
Jagannathan (1998) that bid-ask bounce plays a role in affecting the ex-day price
behaviour.

Bali and Hite (1998) argue that the drop-off ratio is smaller than one due to the fact
that price change is discrete based on tick size while dividend is continuous. Their
argument is that since investors are never willing to pay for more than the value of
the dividend, the level of price drop will be rounded to the next smaller tick. For
example, if the tick size is $1/10 and the dividend amount is $0.15, the stock price
will only drop by $0.1. The implication is that when tick size becomes larger, the
drop-off ratio will deviate more from one. However, inconsistent with Bali and Hite
(1998), Graham et al. (2003) find no change in the drop-off ratio when price
quotation changed from 1/8th to 1/16th. In contrast, Al-Yahyaee (2013) supports
Bali and Hite’s argument. He finds that in Oman, the ex-day drop-off ratio increases
as a result of a smaller tick size.
2.6. Ownership Structure and Dividend Value
In addition to the tax hypothesis, the short-term trading hypothesis, the tax
heterogeneity argument and the market microstructure explanations discussed
above, there are other causes which received attention in an attempt to explain the
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determination of dividend value. M&M (1961) argue that dividend clienteles are
formed by investors’ ages and that the dividend value of low-yield stocks is higher
for young investors. Frank and Jagannathan (1998) attribute the nuisance of
handling with dividends as what makes dividends less valuable for investors. There
are also behavioural studies that attempt to explain dividend value. Thaler and
Shefrin (1981), for example, propose that self-control drives investors to prefer cash
dividends rather than income from capital gains.

In literature, the evidence on how dividend value is correlated with ownership
structure is not clear while the relation between ownership structure and dividend
policy is more solidly established. The aim of studies on ownership structure and
dividend policy is to establish a relation between a group of investors with certain
roles and the level of dividend paid. For instance, some studies document the
relation between institutional holding and dividend policy. Institutional investors,
due to their active monitoring roles, can improve a firm’s value and firms increase
dividends to attract institutions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). As a result, a positive
correlation between institutional holding and dividends is predicted. On the other
hand, managerial owners have the incentives to increase their own wealth rather
than the wealth of outside shareholders and, therefore, might attempt to cut dividend
(Demsetz, 1985). Jensen et al. (1992) support the argument by Demsetz (1985)
when they find that a higher insider ownership is associated with a lower dividend
payout among the US firms. Similarly, Short et al. (2002) document a negative
association between dividend payout and managerial ownership. These results
suggest that dividend policies can be affected by the ownership characteristics.
More recently, some studies attempt to shed light on the relation between ownership
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structure and dividend policy in markets where the State holds a large proportion
of corporate shares. Al-Malkawi (2007) finds that the amount of dividend paid is
largely affected by the presence of the government or its agencies as the largest
shareholders. Wei et al. (2003) report that Chinese firms with higher state
ownership pay higher cash dividends. The case of Vietnam is similar to China in
that shares held by the State are not openly traded in the stock market. In that way,
the main source of stock income for the State is from dividends. Studies in literature,
however, hardly attempt to relate the role of the State in influencing dividend policy
to the perception of investors toward the value of dividends. This issue is explored
in the current study.
2.7. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter provides a theoretical framework which encompasses the concept of
dividend value relative to capital gains. The chapter also discusses a body of
literature which examines various factors able to affect the ex-day stock price
behaviour. It is a common belief among market participants that the ex-day stock
price should fall by the exact amount of dividends, making dividend value
unaffected by external factors such as taxes or transaction costs (Campbell and
Beraneck, 1955). However, empirical findings have shown that stock prices on the
ex-dividend days decrease by the amount of significantly less than the dividend.
Different explanations for this phenomenon have been proposed. The tax
hypothesis argues that dividends are discounted in value against capital gains as a
direct consequence of a higher tax burden on dividends than on capital gains.
Examples of supporters of the tax hypothesis include Barclay (1997), Bell and
Jenkinson (2002), Elton and Gruber (1970), Elton et al. (2005), Green and Rydqvist
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(1999), Lasfer (1995), Lasfer and Zenonos (2003), Milonas et al. (2006) and Francis
et al. (2012). The short-term trading hypothesis provides an alternative proposition.
According to Kalay (1982), how dividends are valued against capital gains can also
be conditional upon the level of transaction costs incurred by short-term investors
around the ex-days. Evidence in support of the short-term trading hypothesis is
provided by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), Karpoff and Walkling (1990) and
Athanassakos (1996) when they find significant abnormal trading volumes around
the ex-days with positive abnormal returns before, and negative abnormal returns
after, the ex-days. The interpretation of the ex-day stock price behaviour is further
complicated by the tax heterogeneity argument and the market microstructure
explanations. Michaely and Vila (1995) argue that tax heterogeneity among
investors can trigger trading around the ex-day. It follows that trading around the
ex-days is then the result of the interaction between investors in different tax
brackets. If this is the case, the ex-day price would not be determined by a single
tax bracket. Market microstructure explanations interpret the ex-day price
behaviour based on variables such as price discreteness, bid-ask bounce and limit
order adjustments. The main argument by supporters of the market microstructure
explanations is that even in the absence of taxes and transaction costs, the stock
price on the ex-day is unlikely to fall by the exact amount of dividend due to market
microstructure factors such as price discreteness, bid-ask bounce and limit order
adjustments.

This study aims at adding to a large body of empirical evidence on the determinants
of the ex-day price and volume behaviour by exploring a unique research setting in
Vietnam where dividends tax rate has never been higher than capital gains tax rate.
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Evidence from this study would provide a new insight into how investors value
dividends and validate the tax hypothesis about the impact of the differential tax
treatment between dividends and capital gains on dividend value. The study is also
expected to provide more direct evidence on how the market value of dividends is
affected by the level of state ownership in a firm. Up to date, the relation between
ownership structure and the market value of dividends is rather underexplored since
the focus of empirical studies has been on examining the impact of ownership
structure on corporate dividend policy.
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CHAPTER 3

INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS OF THE VIETNAMESE MARKET

This chapter discusses relevant institutional features of the Vietnamese stock
market. Section 3.1 explains the equitisation process and the importance of
incorporating state ownership to the study about the impact of taxes on the market
value of dividends. Section 3.2 reviews the development process of the stock market
in Vietnam and the mechanism under which stocks are traded. The situation of
dividend policies of Vietnamese listed firms is also presented. Finally, this chapter
highlights the uniqueness of the tax condition in Vietnam compared to other
markets in previous research.
3.1. Equitisation Process in Vietnam
As part of the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Reform Program, the equitisation
process in Vietnam started in 1992 with a pilot program and the process is still in
progress (Sjoholm, 2006). Vu (2003) proposes that the equitisation process in
Vietnam encompasses two stages: the pilot stage (1992 to 1996), which only
covered the small and medium-sized SOEs, and the extended stage (1996 onward),
which aimed to speed up the equitisation process. Along with the equitisation
process, the number of equitised firms has increased significantly over time. With
only five SOEs equitised by December 1996, the number of equitised firms rose to
25 by June 1998 and surged to more than 1,000 by the end of 2002. Equitisation in
Vietnam is defined as the transformation of SOEs into joint-stock companies via
selling part of the shares in the company to private investors (Sjoholm, 2006). The
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primary purpose of equitisation is to improve performances of SOEs. Equitisation
in Vietnam is considered partial privatisation in the sense that the government does
not lose its ultimate control over the firm. To the contrary, the government still
holds decisive voting rights and controlling roles in most equitised firms. By the
end of 2004, of the total equitised firms, the State on average still holds 38.1 percent
of the total shares (Truong, 2007).8 In a similar manner, in 2012, the State owns
shares in nearly 60 percent of the total listed companies on the Ho Chi Minh Stock
Exchange. Furthermore, firms in which the State owns more than 50 percent of the
shares account for 23.6 percent of the total number of listed firms. 9 In important
economic sectors such as telecommunications, airlines, natural gas and railroad, the
government is still the dominant shareholder (Vo, 2013).
3.2. Vietnam’s Stock Market and Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange
3.2.1. History of Vietnam’s Stock Market
The stock market in Vietnam started its operation in 2000 with the establishment of
Ho Chi Minh Securities Trading Center (HoSTC). Up to now, the development
process of the Vietnam’s stock market can be divided into three periods as follows:
Period 1: From its first day of establishment in 2000 to 2005,
Period 2: From its peak in 2006 to pre-global financial crisis in 2007 and
Period 3: From the slowdown in 2008 to the current time (Tran, 2011).

8

State capital in equitised firms is supervised by State Capital Investment Corporation.
The statistics are based on the annual reports of 283 Vietnamese listed firms on the Ho Chi Minh
Stock Exchange.
9
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Period 1 covers the time with a very small number of listed companies, inactive
trading and incomplete legal framework. As of December 2005, the number of
listed companies was only 32 with total market capitalisation of VND 6,337
million. The Vietnamese stock market set its peak in Period 2 from 2006 to 2007
when VNIndex jumped to nearly 1,200 points in March 2007.10 This period also
observed a surge in the number of listed companies and the level of market
capitalisation. With 138 listed companies, the total market capitalisation of the Ho
Chi Minh Stock Exchange reached VND 361,000 billion. However, the boom did
not last long and the stock market in Vietnam experienced a downturn in Period 3
as a result of the global financial crisis. VNIndex plummeted and reached 235.18
points in February 2009. Since 2010, the stock market has been fairly stable and
VNIndex has revolved around 400–500 points. However, there is no sign that it can
revert back to its heyday of 2006–2007 in the near future.
3.2.2. Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE)
Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (previously known as Ho Chi Minh City Securities
Trading Center) was officially put into operation and executed the first trading
session on 28 July 2000. With the development of the stock market, the number of
companies listed on the HOSE has increased rapidly. With only 62 companies
registered to be members in 2007, as of December 2012, the total number of listed
companies has surged to 306 and the HOSE now accounts for more than 85 percent
of the total market capitalisation of the stock market in Vietnam.

10

VNIndex is a capitalisation weighted index of all equity listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock
Exchange.
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Prior to 4 September 2012, the HOSE operated under the rule T+4. If an investor
buys a stock on business day T, he must wait until business day T+4 for the stock
to be put into his account and it is only on and after business day T+4 that he can
sell the stock.11 From 4 September 2012, rule T+4 is replaced by T+3 which means
that investors are allowed to sell their previously bought stocks one day earlier. For
example, if Investor A buys 1,000 units of stock X on day T, Wednesday 26 June
2013, then business day T+3 is on Monday 1 July 2013. Only on and after Monday
1 July 2013 can Investor A sell his 1,000 units of stock X that he bought on
Wednesday 26 June 2013.
Trading on the HOSE is conducted through a computerised system. The HOSE is
different from the NYSE in that there is no specialist or market maker. Investors
are required to set up their account in a securities firm and all transactions must be
initiated from stockbrokers of the firm. Transaction orders from securities firms will
then be registered into the trading system by the representatives of the firms on the
exchange floor. Buying orders and selling orders are matched to determine the price
(see Appendix 1).12
3.3. Dividend Policies of Vietnamese Listed Companies
3.3.1. Overview of Dividend Policies of Vietnamese Listed Companies
There are two forms of dividend payment made by Vietnamese listed firms: cash
dividends and stock dividends. Some firms distribute profits in both forms at the
same time. Firms can pay dividends quarterly, semi-annually or annually. Once the

11
12

The rule T+4 is specified in HOSE’s Regulation on Time of Payment.
Trading mechanism is specified in HOSE’s Regulation on Trading.
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company makes a dividend announcement, it also announces ex-dividend day,
record day and payment day. To be entitled to receive dividends, investors must
purchase shares before the ex-day. Investors whose names are recorded as
shareholders on the record day are entitled to the dividends. The record day is two
business days after the ex-day in Vietnam. Finally, dividends are delivered on the
announced payment day.
In Vietnam, companies normally announce cash dividend per share as a percentage
of the face or the par value of the stock.13 For example, 10 percent or 20 percent
dividend per share of the stock’s face value means a shareholder is entitled to a
dividend of VND 1,000 or VND 2,000 per share respectively. Figure 3.1 depicts
the mean dividend per share of Vietnamese listed companies on the HOSE from
2001 to 2009. Over the period, the level of dividend per share (DPS) was fairly
stable despite fluctuations in corporate income; particularly from 2005 to 2009, the
mean DPS of Vietnamese listed companies remained at around VND 1,400. In
2008, many companies experienced drastic decreases in profit but the dividend
made remained unchanged. Then in 2009, incomes of these companies were
significantly improved but dividends per share were not increased. And since
companies were reluctant to change dividend per share, dividend payout ratio
fluctuated over time as earnings per share changed (Nguyen, 2011).14 As illustrated
in Figure 3.2, with the stable mean DPS of approximately VND 1,400 from 2005
to 2007, the mean annual payout ratio varied greatly with 93.3 percent in 2005,
plummeted to 47.3 percent in 2006 and 41.2 percent in 2007. Some companies even

13

Face or par value of a stock is equal to VND 10,000.
Dividend per share
14
Dividend payout ratio is calculated as:
.
Earnings per share
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paid dividends out of negative earnings. The most notable case was FPT Company
in 2007. FPT announced a DPS of VND 2,500 per share while incurring a negative
EPS of VND –7,481 per share.
Figure 3.1: Dividend per Share (DPS) of Vietnamese Listed Companies
This figure depicts the mean annual dividend per share of Vietnamese listed companies on
the HOSE from 2001 to 2009. Dividend per Share is calculated as at 31 December and is
recorded in the annual financial report of the firm.
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Figure 3.2: Payout Ratio (DPR) of Vietnamese Listed Companies
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This figure depicts the mean annual payout ratio of Vietnamese listed companies on the
HOSE from 2001 to 2009. Dividend payout ratio is calculated as Dividend per
Share/Earnings per Share in which annual Dividend per Share and annual Earnings per
Share are calculated as at 31 December and are recorded in the annual financial report of
the firm.
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3.3.2. Dividend Policies of Vietnamese Listed Companies based on State
Ownership
Along with year-to-year fluctuations, the payout ratio also varies among companies
with different levels of state ownership. Based on information collected from firms’
annual reports, Table 3.1 presents the mean annual payout ratio of listed companies
on the HOSE by year and state ownership. Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Wei
et al. (2003), the level of state ownership is partitioned into three groups: High,
Medium and Low. Accordingly, state ownership is high if the State holds more than
50 percent of the total shares of the company, is medium if the State holds between
20 to 50 percent of the total shares and is low if the proportion of shares held by the
State is less than 20 percent. Except in 2011, companies within the “High” group
consistently paid out the highest portion of earnings as dividends. Moreover, the
mean payout ratio is higher for the “High” group and the test of difference confirms
a statistically significant difference in payout ratios across the three groups in 2008,
2010 and 2012. The pattern is consistent with what is found in China. Wei et al.
(2003) report Chinese firms with higher state ownership pay higher cash dividends.
The underlying reason as argued by Wei et al. (2003) is that shares owned by the
State cannot be publicly traded, therefore providing no avenue for accessing capital
gains for the State. By the same token, higher dividend payouts associated with a
higher state ownership can then be interpreted as a means for Vietnamese
companies to provide regular incomes to the State.
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Table 3.1: Payout Ratio of Listed Companies on the HOSE by Year and State Ownership
This table presents the mean annual payout ratio of listed companies on the HOSE from 2008 to 2012 by state ownership.
Payout ratio is calculated as Dividend per share/Earnings per share. Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Wei et al.
(2003), the level of state ownership is high if the State holds more than 50 percent of the total shares, is medium if the
State holds between 20 to 50 percent of the total shares and is low if the State holds less than 20 percent of the total shares
of the company. The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.

Year
State Ownership

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

High (>50%)

53.6%

43.2%

23.9%

43.8%

49.2%

Medium (20%–50%)

50.4%

25.6%

20.6%

44.5%

23.1%

Low (<20%)

34.1%

29.2%

11.7%

45.5%

10.7%

 2 = 8.37**

 2 = 6.23*

 2 = 6.52*

 2 = 2.10

 2 = 9.98***

Test of difference between
High, Medium and Low
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3.4. Tax Mechanism in Vietnam
Currently, Vietnam operates a classic tax system in which dividends are taxed at
both corporate and personal levels. Dividends are paid out of after-tax corporate
income. Dividends then become part of personal income and are taxed at the
personal income tax rate. Both residents and non-residents are subject to flat tax
rates on dividends and capital gains. With regards to other assessable incomes,
Vietnamese residents are taxed progressively at a rate of up to 35 percent while a
flat rate of 20 percent is applied to non-residents.

Corporate income tax in Vietnam is regulated by the Law on Enterprise Income Tax
which was promulgated by the National Assembly in June 2008. According to
Article 10 of this law, from 1 January 2009, the standard corporate tax rate is 25
percent. In case of firms operating business activities related to prospecting,
exploring, exploiting oil and gas and other rare natural resources, the corporate tax
rate ranges between 32 percent and 50 percent. Prior to 2009, the standard corporate
income tax rate was 28 percent.

Under the Vietnamese taxation law, dividends tax rate has never been higher than
capital gains tax rate. Since 2006, there have been three significant changes in tax
regulations. Prior to 30 June 2010, there was no tax on either dividends or capital
gains. The Law on Personal Income Tax 2007 stipulated a dividends tax rate of five
percent and a capital gains tax rate of 20 percent which applied to dividends
received and capital gains realised after 1 July 2010. In 2011, due to economic
difficulties and stock market downturn associated with the impact of the Global
Financial Crisis, the National Assembly approved Resolution 08/2011/QH13 which
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removed tax on dividend income and reduced the capital gains tax rate by half.
Consequently, the sample period can be divided into three sub-periods where
different tax rates on dividends and capital gains are applicable. The summary table
is presented as follows:

Table 3.2 : Regulations and Tax Schemes
Tax rate (%)
Period
1
2
3

Date
1 January 2006 –
30 June 2010
1 July 2010 –
31 July 2011
1 August 2011 –
31 December 2012

Regulations
Dividends

Capital gains

0

0

5

20

0

10

None
Law on Personal
Income Tax
Resolution
08/2011/QH13

The dividends and capital gains tax rates in Period 2 and Period 3 from 1 July 2010
to 31 December 2012 contribute to the uniqueness of the Vietnamese market
compared to other countries in previous research. While some studies have
examined countries during the periods of no tax on either dividends or capital gains
such as Hong Kong and Oman, little attention has been paid to the case where
capital gains are more heavily taxed than dividends. One possible explanation for
the lighter taxation treatment on dividends than on capital gains in Vietnam is
because investors are “playing with” rather than investing in stocks (Nguyen et al.,
2011). This implies that a high level of tax rate on capital gains may play a role in
curbing short-term trading. Nonetheless, the motive behind Vietnamese regulators
placing capital gains in such tax disadvantaged positions compared to dividends
still remains puzzling.
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3.5. Summary of the Institutional Settings of the Study
This study is conducted using information of Vietnamese listed companies on the
HOSE in Vietnam. The tax mechanism in Vietnam is featured by flat tax rates on
both dividends and capital gains. More interestingly, the tax rates on dividends have
never been higher than on capital gains. The equitisation process in Vietnam also
provides an important foundation for this study in that many of the listed firms on
the HOSE are equitised SOEs. As before, the State still holds a significant
proportion of shares in many of these listed firms.
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CHAPTER 4
HYPOTHESES, DATA AND METHODS

This chapter discusses how hypotheses for this study are developed and tested.
Section 4.1 derives eight hypotheses based on the relevant literature in Chapter 2
and the background of the Vietnamese market in Chapter 3. Section 4.2 describes
the source of data for the study. In Section 4.3, details of the hypothesis testing
procedures are outlined. Finally, a summary of hypotheses and hypothesis testing
techniques is provided in Section 4.4.
4.1. Development of Hypotheses
Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that the differential tax treatment between dividends
and capital gains is the major driving force of the ex-day behaviour of stocks. They
propose that the tax disadvantage of dividends relative to capital gains causes the
ex-day drop-off ratio to be smaller than one. Such arguments rest in the following
equation:

DR =

Pcum  Pex 1  td
=
1  tg
D

(1)

From 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010 (i.e. Period 1), there were neither taxes on
dividends nor on capital gains. Setting td and t g as zero leads to equation (2) below:

DR =
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Pcum  Pex
=1
D

(2)

From the equation (2) above, the following hypothesis is expected to be accepted:
H1: Drop-off ratios from 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010 (Period 1) are not
different from one.
From 1 July 2010 to 31 July 2011 (i.e. Period 2) and from 1 August 2011 to 31
December 2012 (i.e. Period 3), the dividends tax rate was consistently higher than
the capital gains tax rate, therefore

1  td
should be greater than one. As a result,
1  tg

equation (1) can be expressed as:
DR =

Pcum  Pex
>1
D

(3)

Equation (3) above shows that when dividends are taxed at a lower rate than capital
gains, the following two hypotheses are expected to be accepted:
H2: Drop-off ratios from 1 July 2010 to 31 July 2011 (Period 2) are greater than
one.
H3: Drop-off ratios from 1 August 2011 to 31 December 2012 (Period 3) are
greater than one.
Kalay (1982) argues that the relative difference between dividends and capital gains
tax cannot fully explain the ex-day price behaviour if short-term traders are active
around the ex-days. The presence of short-term trading activity can be proved if
abnormal trading volumes are significant (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986). In
this study, the sample period from 2006 to 2012 is partitioned into three sub-periods
based on different levels of dividends and capital gains tax rate. Nonetheless, if the
ex-day price behaviour is influenced by short-term traders, positive abnormal
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volumes are expected in all three sub-periods. Therefore, the following hypothesis
is tested and is expected to be accepted:
H4: Abnormal volumes in all three sub-periods are greater than zero.
The ability of short-term traders to make profits is largely affected by the level of
transaction costs. Higher transaction costs reduce short-term traders’ incentive
thereby depressing the level of abnormal volumes around the ex-day (Karpoff and
Walkling, 1988). Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) also argue that transaction
costs are higher for low-yielding stock. Therefore, the acceptance of the following
hypotheses will suggest that abnormal trading around the ex-day is triggered by
short-term investors.
H5a: Abnormal volumes are negatively correlated to transaction costs.
H5b: Abnormal volumes are positively correlated to dividend yields.
Abnormal returns around the ex-days are used in short-term trading analysis to
identify investors’ preference toward dividends. If investors are lured by dividends
so that dividend capture activities by short-term traders result around the ex-day,
abnormal returns are expected to be positive before the ex-day as a result of
increased buying pressure and turn negative after the ex-day to reflect increased
selling pressure (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986; Lasfer, 1995). The following
hypothesis is expected to be accepted in the Vietnamese market:
H6: Abnormal returns are positive before the ex-days and become negative on and
after the ex-days.
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Michaely and Vila (1995) argue that tax heterogeneity among investors affects the
behaviour of short-term traders around the ex-days. They also find that when the
difference between dividends and capital gains tax is widened, the level of shortterm trading around the ex-days is higher. If tax is taken into consideration by shortterm traders on the HOSE, after 1 July 2010 when dividends have a tax advantage
relative to capital gains, abnormal trading volumes will be higher compared to when
dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate are equal. If it is the case, the following
hypothesis should be accepted:
H7: Abnormal volumes are higher after 1 July 2010.
Under the agency cost theory, Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividends act to
reduce the amount of free cash flow that might be wasted by the managers.
Recently, Vojtech (2012) proves that dividend policies can limit information
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. That is, information asymmetry is lower
for dividend paying companies than for non-dividend paying companies. Studies
using agency theory have also reported a correlation between ownership structure
and dividend policy of the firm. Jensen et al. (1992) find that a higher insider
ownership is associated with a lower dividend payout among US firms. Similarly,
Short et al. (2002) document a negative association between dividend payout and
managerial ownership. In Asian markets, Wei et al. (2003) report that Chinese firms
with higher state ownership pay higher cash dividends. To the degree that
ownership structure can influence dividend policies, which in turn affect the level
of agency problems of the company, it is hypothesised that there is a correlation
between how dividends are valued relative to capital gains and the ownership
structure of the company. Ownership structure of Vietnamese listed companies in
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this study is characterised by a high concentration of state ownership; therefore, the
following hypothesis is tested:
H8: There is a relationship between state ownership and the market value of
dividends.
4.2. Data
The sample used in this research includes 265 dividend paying firms during the
period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012. Information about dividend
payments, ex-dividend days, and stock prices of Vietnamese listed companies on
the HOSE was obtained from Thomson Reuters Tick History and Securities
Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The one-year interest rate on
Vietnamese government notes were also collected from SIRCA. Trading volumes
and market index during the study period were acquired through cafef.vn and
hsx.vn.15 Finally, information on ownership structure was compiled manually from
annual reports of the listed companies on the HOSE.
4.3. Methods
In this study, I make several comparisons of drop-off ratios, abnormal volumes and
abnormal returns. First, drop-off ratios are computed for three sub-periods with
different levels of tax rates on dividends and capital gains. Both mean and median
drop-off ratios in each sub-period are then tested against one. Secondly,
observations in each period are sub-divided based on state ownership into high,
medium and low state ownership. The drop-off ratios across three state ownership

15

cafef.vn is a website synthetising trading information from all stock trading centres in Vietnam.
hsx.vn is the official website of Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange.
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levels are then compared and tested for difference to examine how the market value
of dividends is affected by ownership structure. Third, abnormal volumes and
abnormal returns around the ex-days are tested against zero to examine the
significance of short-term trading around the ex-days. In addition to univariate
analysis, regression analysis is performed to control for other factors which may
affect the ex-day behaviour.
4.3.1. Drop-off Ratio Comparisons
The study uses both raw and market adjusted drop-off ratios. The raw and market
adjusted drop-off ratios are computed as follows:
Raw drop-off ratio (DR) =

Pcum  Pex
D

Pcum 
Market adjusted drop-off ratio (Adj DR) =

I ex
 Pex
I cum
D

in which Pcum is the closing stock price on the day before the ex-day, Pex is the
closing stock price on the ex-day, Icum represents market index on the day before
the ex-day and Iex represents market index on the ex-day.
To test hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, the comparisons of DR and Adj DR are
conducted using both parametric t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank
test (or Kruskal-Wallis test).
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4.3.2. Trading Activities around the Ex-days
4.3.2.1. Abnormal Trading Volumes
To calculate abnormal trading volumes around the ex-days, this research uses event
study method [see Brown and Warner (1980); Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986)].
Each ex-day is referred to as an event. Following Lakonishok and Vermalen (1986),
abnormal trading volumes are calculated for a trading window of 11 days
encompassing five days before and after and the ex-day itself. The daily abnormal
volume (AV) is calculated as AV =

V  NV
in which V is the daily trading volume
NV

and NV is the estimated normal trading volume. Following the work of Callaghan
and Barry (2003), normal trading volume is estimated as the mean of daily trading
volumes over two periods: day 45 to day 15 before the ex-day and day 15 to day 45
after the ex-day.
To test Hypothesis H4, abnormal trading volumes are tested against zero using the
standardization procedure. The standardization procedure was first introduced by
Brown and Warner (1980) and was later utilized by Lakonishok and Vermaelen
(1986), Callaghan and Barry (2003), and Jun et al. (2008) to test the significance of
abnormal volumes. The standardization procedure is as follows.
The standardized abnormal volume is first calculated as:

SAVt =

AVt

Sˆ ( AVt )

in which SAVt is the standardized abnormal volume on day t, Sˆ ( AVt ) is the
estimated standard deviation of AVt in the control period from day 45 to day 15
before the ex-day and day 15 to day 45 after the ex-day.
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The mean standardized abnormal volume is then calculated as:

SAVt


=

N
t 1

SAVt

N

in which SAVt is the mean standardized abnormal trading volume on day t, N is
the number of ex-day events.
Finally, the t-statistic on each day of the period (– 5 to +5) will be calculated as
follows:

SAVt
tˆ 
ˆ
S ( SAV )
in which Sˆ ( SAV ) is the estimated standard deviation of SAVt calculated from the
control period of (– 45 to – 15) and (15 to 45).
4.3.2.2. Cumulative Abnormal Volumes
To test hypotheses H5a, H5b and H7, following Michaely and Vila (1996),
cumulative abnormal volumes of a stock on day t is calculated as follows:
CAVt  u -5 AVu
t

4.3.2.3. Abnormal Returns
To test Hypothesis H6, following Lakoniskok and Vermaelen (1986), abnormal
returns are calculated for a trading period of 11 days encompassing the ex-day.
Following Callaghan and Barry (2003), abnormal return is calculated in the
following way:
ABRETi,t = (RETi,t – rf,t) – (α + β(rm,t – rf,t))
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(4)

in which rf,t is the one-year interest rate on Vietnamese government notes, rm,t is the
daily return of VNINDEX on day t, ABRETi,t is the abnormal return of stock i on
day t, RETi,t is the daily return of stock i on day t. RET for five days before, five
days after the ex-day and on the ex-day are calculated as follows:
For days (– 5,– 1) and (1,5): RETi,t = (Pi,t – Pi,t-1)/ Pi,t-1
For the ex-day:

RETi,0 = (Pex – Pcum + D)/Pcum

α and β in equation (4) are estimated based on a market model for each event in the
control periods from day 45 to day 15 before the ex-day and from day 15 to day 45
after the ex-day:
ri,t – rf ,t = α+ β(rm,t – rf,t) + ε
in which rf,t is the one-year interest rate on Vietnamese government notes, ri,t is the
daily return of stock i on day t and rm,t is the daily return of VNINDEX on day t.
As argued by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) and Lasfer (1995), the trading
pattern on a certain day can be identified based on abnormal return on that day since
a positive abnormal return is associated with increased buying pressure and
negative abnormal return is associated with selling pressure.
4.3.3. Regression Analysis
4.3.3.1. Regression Analysis on Ex-day Drop-off Ratios and Ex-day Abnormal
Returns
Ex-day abnormal returns are used to complement ex-day drop-off ratios in regression
analysis since drop-off ratios might suffer from heteroskedasticity (Eades et al.,
1984). A drop-off ratio of less than one is expected to result in positive ex-day
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abnormal return and vice versa. In other words, a higher abnormal return would
imply a lower market value of dividends. To test Hypothesis H8, ex-day drop-off
ratios and ex-day abnormal returns are regressed based on the following models:
DRi,t = α + β0Sizei,t + β1DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t +
+β3 Dummy if period 1 + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε

(5)

ABRETi,t = α + β0Sizei,t + β1DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t +
+ β3 Dummy if period 1 + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε

(6)

in which: the control variables of DY and Size are based on Kadapakkam et al.
(2010) while the dummy variables are used to indicate the sub-periods in which a
change in dividends and capital gains tax occurs. DY represents Dividend Yield
while Size represents the natural logarithm of Market Capitalisation.16 State
ownership refers to the proportion of shares owned by the State. Dummy variables
are included to allow for the changes in the differential tax treatment between
dividends and capital gains. Dummy if period 2 takes the value of one if the dividend
payment is made between 1 July 2010 and 31 July 2011 and zero otherwise. Dummy
if period 3

takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made after 1 August 2011

and zero otherwise.
4.3.3.2. Regression Analysis on Abnormal Volumes
If abnormal volumes around the ex-days are significant on the HOSE, following
Kalay (1982) and Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), it is hypothesized that the
arbitrage activity of short-term traders are affected by factors such as transaction

16

Market Capitalisation = Stock price* Number of Outstanding shares.
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costs and risks. Accordingly, to test Hypotheses H5a, H5b and H7, cumulative
abnormal volumes are regressed using the following model:
CAVi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 Betai,t + β3 1/Pcum i,t +
+β4 State Ownershipi,t + β5 Dummyif period 2 + β6 Dummy if period 3 + ε

(7)

The control variables beta, Size and DY are based on Michaely and Vila (1996).
DY represents Dividend Yield while Size represents the natural logarithm of
Market Capitalisation. Following relevant previous research [see Karpoff and
Walkling (1988); Cloyd et al. (2004); Al Yahyaee et al. (2008)], 1/Pcum is used as a
proxy for transaction cost. Karpoff and Walkling (1988) report a positive
correlation between 1/Pcum and transaction cost. Therefore, a higher 1/Pcum would
indicate a higher transaction cost for the stock. Dummy if period 2 takes the value of
one if the dividend payment is made between 1 July 2010 and 31 July 2011 and
zero otherwise. Dummy if period 3 takes the value of one if the dividend payment is
made after 1 August 2011 and zero otherwise.
4.3.3.3. Regression Techniques
(a) OLS Regression
Equation (5), (6) and (7) are first estimated using OLS method. The presence of
heteroskedasticity is tested using White’s test and Breusch–Pagan test.
Autocorrelation is diagnosed using Durbin–Watson statistic and Breusch–Godfrey
serial correlation LM Test. When only heteroskedasticity exists, OLS standard
errors are corrected using White’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance
estimators. When only autocorrelation exists, data are transformed using Cochrane–
Orcutt procedure. When both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are present in
the residuals, the Newey West standard error correction method is used.
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(b) Robust Regression
When the data suffer from the presence of outliers, robust regression provides a
better regression estimation compared to OLS. Robust regression has previously
been used in literature to estimate the market value of dividends [see Davidson and
Mallin (1989); Armitage, Hodgkinson and Partington (2006)]. Unlike OLS, robust
regression assigns unequal weight to each observation with outliers receiving
smaller weights. In this study, the allocation of weight to observations is determined
using Hubert weight.
(c) Panel Regression
Panel regression is used to deal with two-dimensional data which are usually
collected over time and over the same individuals. The use of panel regression in
financial studies was first introduced by Frankel and Rose (1996). For the current
study, each company typically distributed dividends more than once during the
sample period; therefore, panel regression is used.17 The Hausman test is used to
determine whether the random effects or the fixed effects model is more efficient.
The random effects model is applicable when the individual stock effects are
uncorrelated with the independent variables. In contrast, the fixed effects model is
preferred when the individual stock effects are correlated with the independent
variables.

17

A stock with only one observation during the sample period is eliminated from panel regression.
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4.4. Summary of Hypotheses, Data and Methods
The current study aims to examine the impact of taxes and state ownership on the
market value of dividends using both univariate and multivariate analyses. Table
4.1 provides a summary of hypotheses to be tested and the techniques used to test
each hypothesis. Hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 test the impact of the differential tax
treatment between dividends and capital gains on the market value of dividends.
Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that the value of dividends is discounted against
capital gains due to a heavier tax rate on dividends. If the difference between
dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate affects how dividends are valued
relative to capital gains in the Vietnamese market, hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 are
expected to be accepted. The impact of taxes on the market value of dividends is
hypothesised to be weakened when abnormal trading is triggered around the ex-day
by short-term traders. The acceptance of hypotheses H4, H5 and H6 will indicate
the existence of short-term trading around the ex-days. Hypothesis H7 is tested to
investigate whether the differential tax treatment on dividends and on capital gains
affect the short-term trading around the ex-days. Finally, the impact of ownership
structure on the market value of dividends is examined through the testing of
Hypothesis H8.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Hypotheses and Hypothesis Testing Technique
Hypothesis
Hypothesis Testing Technique
H1: Drop-off ratios from 1 January 2006 to 30 Univariate analysis:
June 2010 (Period 1) are not different from one.
 Direct comparisons of the mean and
H2: Drop-off ratios from 1 July 2010 to 31 July
median drop-off ratios
2011 (Period 2) are greater than one.
 Test of difference (against 1): t-test and
H3: Drop-off ratios from 1 August 2011 to 31
Wilcoxon signed ranks test
December 2012 (Period 3) are greater than one.
Univariate analysis:
H4: Abnormal volumes in all three sub-periods
 Direct comparison of abnormal
are greater than zero.
volumes and 0
Multivariate analysis:
H5a: Abnormal volumes are negatively correlated
to transaction costs.



Regression of abnormal volumes on
transaction costs

Univariate analysis:

H5b: Abnormal volumes are positively correlated
to dividend yields.

And multivariate analysis:


H6: Abnormal returns are positive before the exdays and become negative on and after the exdays.

Direct comparison of abnormal
volumes among different level of
dividend yields

Regression of abnormal volumes on
dividend yields

Univariate analysis:


Direct comparison of abnormal returns
and 0

Univariate analysis:


Direct comparison of abnormal
volumes among 3 sub-periods

H7: Abnormal volumes are higher after 1 July
And multivariate analysis:
2010.
 Regression of abnormal volumes on the
two dummy variables of Period 2 and
Period 3
Univariate analysis:


Direct comparison of drop-off ratios
among different level of ownership
structure

H8: There is a relationship between state
ownership and the market value of dividends.
And multivariate analysis:
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Regression of ex-day drop-off ratios
and regression of ex-day abnormal
returns on state ownership

CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

This chapter outlines the empirical results on drop-off ratios, abnormal volumes and
abnormal returns to assist the hypothesis testing procedure. All results from
univariate analysis will be provided in Section 5.1, followed by comprehensive
regression analysis in Section 5.2. Finally, Section 5.3 provides a summary of how
univariate analysis and regression analysis lead to the acceptance or rejection of the
hypotheses presented in Section 4.4 Chapter 4. Also included in Section 5.3 are the
conclusions on the impact of taxes and state ownership on the market value of
dividends in the Vietnamese market and how state ownership can act as a
moderating factor in explaining the ex-day stock price behaviour.
5.1. Univariate Analysis
5.1.1. Drop-off Ratios
To minimise potential problems of confounding effects caused by other
announcements, an ex-dividend day is chosen only if there is no other important
corporate event on that day such as earnings announcement, stock dividends, stock
split or rights issues. The ex-day event is eliminated if there is no trade on either the
cum-dividend day or the ex-day. These selection criteria leave a data set of 1,413
cash dividend events.
Table 5.1 provides a summary of descriptive statistics of dividend variables
observed during the sample period. The mean dividend yield of the full sample is
4.74 percent. That level of dividend yield is relatively high compared to the mean
dividend yield in some other markets such as 2.3 percent in the US (Zhang et al.,
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2008) and 2.1 percent in Australia (Jun et al., 2008). The mean raw drop-off ratio
(DRraw) and adjusted drop-off ratio (DRadj) are both close to one at 0.97 and 0.94
respectively. DRraw and DRadj are then computed for the three sub-periods where
different tax rates on dividends and capital gains were applied.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Dividend Variables
This table outlines descriptive statistics for the full sample from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012. It consists of 1,413 ex-dividend events
of Vietnamese listed companies on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE). Pcum and Pex are the closing price on the cum-day and the exday respectively. D is the amount of dividend in Vietnamese Dong (VND). DY is calculated as the ratio of dividend to Pcum. DR is calculated
as (Pcum-Pex)/D. Market-adjusted drop-off ratios (DRadj) are calculated from drop-off ratios after adjusting Pcum by the ratio of market index
on the ex-day (Iex) to market index on the cum-day (Icum).

Mean
Median
Stdev
Minimum
Maximum
Obs

Pcum(VND)
35,848.06
26,000.00
37,862.72
4,400.00
513,000.00

Pex(VND)
34,763.80
25,000.00
37,886.62
4,100.00
515,000.00

D (VND)
1,083.80
1,000.00
598.68
100.00
6,000.00
1,413
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DY (%)
4.74
3.85
3.62
0.19
25.00

DRraw
0.97
0.80
2.24
– 20.00
22.00

DRadj
0.94
0.81
2.32
– 20.75
25.12

5.1.1.1. Period with No Tax on either Dividends or Capital Gains (Period 1)
Period 1, from 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010, is the period with no tax on either
dividends or capital gains. As argued by Elton and Gruber (1970), if the tax
differential between dividends and capital gains drives the ex-day price, then for
the period with no such differential, the drop-off ratio should be one and the
following hypothesis H1 should be accepted.
H1: Drop-off ratios from 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010 (Period 1) are not
different from one.

Table 5.2 provides a summary of drop-off ratios and market-adjusted drop-off ratios
for Period 1. The mean drop-off ratio and adjusted drop-off ratio are 1.031 and
1.006 respectively. Both t-test and Signed Rank test prove that DRraw and DRadj in
this period with neither tax on dividends nor on capital gains are not statistically
different from one, leading to the acceptance of Hypothesis H1. This result is
different from evidence found in other markets which do not impose taxes on
dividends and capital gains. For example, both Frank and Jagannathan (1998) and
Al Yahyaee et al. (2008) report a mean drop-off ratio significantly lower than one
in Hong Kong and Oman respectively during the period of no dividends and capital
gains taxes. This result, however, is supportive of the tax-based explanation of the
ex-day price behaviour by Elton and Gruber (1970).
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Table 5.2: Summary of DRs and Adjusted DRs in Period 1
This table provides a summary of drop-off ratios and market-adjusted drop-off ratios for Period 1. To calculate market-adjusted drop-off
ratios, Pcum is adjusted by the ratio of market index on the ex-day (Iex) to market index on the cum-day (Icum). In this period, there was no tax
on either dividends or capital gains, that is td=tg=0. a : p > 0.05 H0: DR=1 using one-sample t test, b : p > 0.05 H0: DR =1 using Signed Rank
test.

Mean
Median
Test H0: DR=1

DRraw
1.03
0.80
t = 0.28a
S = –8132b

Obs

DRadj
1.00
0.88
t = 0.05a
S = –15528.5b
695
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5.1.1.2. Periods with Differential Dividends and Capital Gains Tax Treatment
(Periods 2 and 3)
Following Period 1, Period 2, from 1 July 2010 to 31 July 2011, is the period when
Vietnam experiences a differential treatment on dividends and capital gains
incomes as a result of tax regulation changes. From 1 July 2010, Law on Personal
Income tax required all dividend incomes to be taxed at five percent while imposing
a much larger tax rate of 20 percent on capital gains income.
Period 3 arises as a result of Resolution QH08/2011 coming into effect. From
August 2011 to December 2012, dividends and capital gains were taxed at zero
percent and 10 percent respectively. Accordingly, if the tax hypothesis is true, a
change in the tax code is expected to influence the market value of dividends during
both Period 2 and Period 3. For the case of Vietnam, it is expected that during the
time that dividends were taxed at a lower rate than capital gains, drop-off ratios
should increase to a value greater than one. The following two hypotheses are
tested:
H2: Drop-off ratios from 1 July 2010 to 31 July 2011 (Period 2) are greater than
one.
H3: Drop-off ratios from 1 August 2011 to 31 December 2012 (Period 3) are
greater than one.
The mean DRraw (DRadj) in Period 2 and Period 3 are 0.9437 (0.8832) and 0.9072
(0.8854) respectively and they are not statistically different from one at any
conventional level using both one-sample t-test and Signed Rank test. The results
lead to the rejection of both Hypothesis H2 and Hypothesis H3 and are not
consistent with the prediction of the tax hypothesis that a lower tax rate on dividends
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than on capital gains should produce greater-than-one drop-off ratios. Furthermore,
the Kruskal–Wallis test confirms that there is no statistically significant difference
in both DRraw and DRadj across the three periods. In other words, a lower tax rate
on dividends than on capital gains did not lead to an increased value of dividends.
The results indicate that the relative difference between dividends tax rate and
capital gains tax rates does not significantly influence the market value of dividends
in Vietnam. This is consistent with some previous studies that find dividends and
capital gains tax rate to be uncorrelated with the ex-day drop-off ratios. For
example, Michaely (1991) finds no change in the ex-day drop-off ratios in the US
market when the differential tax treatment between dividends and capital gains was
removed. In a similar manner, Daunfeldt (2002) provides evidence against the tax
hypothesis in Sweden when he reports no change in the ex-day drop-off ratios
following substantial changes in the tax policy.18 The explanations for this
phenomenon of lower-than-one drop-off ratio vary greatly. It might be due to the
ability of investors to defer capital gains realization so that the effective tax rate on
capital gains is still lower than the effective tax rate on dividends (Zhang et al.,
2008). Another possible explanation rests in the activities of short-term traders
around the ex-days. Kalay (1982) argues that when short-term trading is present
around the ex-days, it is the transaction cost, not the relative tax rates on dividends
and capital gains, that determines the ex-day drop-off ratios.

18

During the sample period from 1988 to 1995, Daunfelt (2002) reports six significant changes in
the marginal dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. The marginal tax rate is defined as the tax
rate in the highest tax bracket. From 1988 to 1990: t d=tg=54%; in 1991: td=tg=30%; from 1992 to
1993: td=30%, tg=25%; in 1994: td=0%, tg=12.5%; in 1995: td=tg=30%.
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics of DRs and Adjusted DRs and Test of Difference across Periods 1, 2 and 3
This table presents drop-off ratios and adjusted drop-off ratios in three periods determined based on different levels of dividends tax rate (td)
and capital gains tax rate (tg). In Period 1, td =tg= 0%; in Period 2: td = 5%, tg = 20%; in Period 3, td = 0%, tg = 10%. c : p > 0.05 using Kruskal–
Wallis test.
Panel A: Drop-off Ratios
Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

Mean

1.03

0.94

0.91

Median

1.00

0.73

0.85

Obs

695

349

369

Test of difference between Period 1, Period 2 and Period 3

 2 =2.27c

Panel B: Adjusted Drop-off Ratios
Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

Mean

1.01

0.88

0.89

Median

0.88

0.76

0.86

Obs

695

349

369

Test of difference between Period 1, Period 2 and Period 3
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 2 =4.18c

5.1.1.3. Drop-off Ratios and State Ownership
As mentioned earlier in section 3.2 of Chapter 3, after the equitisation process in
Vietnam, the State still holds the controlling role in most equitised firms (Truong,
2007). For listed companies on the HOSE which is the focus of this research, as of
2012, firms in which the State owns more than 50 percent of the shares account for
23.6 percent of the total number of listed firms.19 This section provides empirical
results on drop-off ratios in each sub-period based on the level of state ownership
to test the following hypothesis:
H8: There is a relationship between state ownership and the market value of
dividends.
As presented in Table 5.4, the result is consistent over the three sub-periods that
both the raw and adjusted drop-off ratios increase along with the level of state
ownership. And the Kruskal–Wallis test proves that the mean drop-off ratio of stocks
with high state ownership is the highest in all three sub-periods. This result suggests
that dividends of stocks with a high level of state ownership are more valuable to
investors than dividends of stocks with a low level of state ownership. One possible
explanation for this phenomenon is Vietnamese listed firms with higher state
ownership tend to pay a higher level of cash dividends. Over the period from 2008
to 2012, companies with a high level of state ownership show a fairly consistent
pattern of highest payout ratios.20 This might also be explained from an agency cost

19

This statistic is based on the annual report of 283 listed firms on the HOSE.
Details on payout ratios according to the level of state ownership can be found at section 3.3
Chapter 3 of this thesis.
20
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perspective. Relating state ownership to information asymmetry, Choi, Sami and
Zhou (2010) argue that state ownership is positively associated with the firm’s
information asymmetry during the period of inactive control transfer and great
deviation between cash flows rights and control rights. On the other hand, agency
cost theory proposes that dividend payment helps to reduce free cash flows which
might be wasted by the company’s managers otherwise. Vojtech (2012) further
proves that under the presence of asymmetric information, dividends are used as a
tool to mitigate agency problems and that the more severe asymmetric information
problem, the more outside investors prefer dividends compared to retained
earnings. Therefore, if it is the case in the Vietnamese market that information
asymmetry is higher for companies with higher state ownership, then information
asymmetry may have had an influence on the positive correlation between the
market value of dividends and the level of state ownership. Nonetheless, as the
positive correlation between state ownership and information asymmetry has not
been proved in the Vietnamese market, further research would be required to
explain why dividends of companies with a high level of state ownership are more
valuable compared to dividends of companies with lower state ownership.

Observing the drop-off ratios of stocks with high state ownership reveals some
interesting results. In Period 1, the mean drop-off ratio is 1.206 and is not
statistically different from one (t=1.08, p>0.1). The median drop-off ratio is 1.333
and is also not statistically different from one (S= –1142, p>0.1). Similarly, the
mean and median adjusted drop-off ratio are 1.072 and 0.926 respectively and are
not statistically different from one (t=0.37, p>0.1; S= –1189, p>0.1). On the other
hand, the mean drop-off ratios of Period 2 and Period 3 are both statistically greater
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than one at all conventional levels. A greater-than-one drop-off ratio indicates that
the market value of dividends is greater than its face value. McDonald (2001) once
reports a drop-off ratio of 1.26 in Germany which he argues to be the result of the
tax credit associated with the imputation tax system. However, the pattern of equalto-one drop-off ratios in Period 1 and greater-than-one drop-off ratios in Period 2
and Period 3 is not evident for stocks with low and medium state ownership. The
mean drop-off ratios of stocks with low state ownership in all three sub-periods are
significantly smaller than one. For stocks with medium state ownership, the mean
drop-off ratio in Period 1 of 1.152 is not statistically different from one (t=1.03,
p>0.1; S= –1038, p>0.1) but the mean drop-off ratios in Period 2 of 0.92 and Period
3 of 0.68 are both statistically smaller than one. These results on drop-off ratios at
different levels of state ownership suggest that the tax hypothesis is applicable for
stocks with high state ownership, but not for stocks with low and medium state
ownership.
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Table 5.4: Drop-off Ratios by State Ownership
This table presents drop-off ratios in three periods based on three levels of state ownership (SO). Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Wei
et al. (2003), state ownership is high, medium and low if the State holds more than 50 percent, from 20 to 50 percent and smaller than 20
percent of the total number of shares in the company respectively. Market-adjusted drop-off ratios are calculated from drop-off ratios after
adjusting Pcum by the ratio of market index on the ex-day (Iex) to market index on the cum-day (Icum). The Kruskal–Wallis test is used to test
for the difference in drop-off ratios and adjusted drop-off ratios among High SO, Medium SO and Low SO. The Kruskal–Wallis test is also
used to test for the difference in drop-off ratios and adjusted drop-off ratios among three periods. The values of adjusted drop-off ratios and
corresponding test statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisk *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.

Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

Mean

1.21 (1.07)

1.77 (1.30)

1.59 (1.21)

Median

1.33 (0.96)

1.33 (1.08)

1.20 (1.08)

217

90

116

Mean

1.15 (1.12)

0.92 (0.94)

0.68 (0.85)

Median

0.33 (0.84)

0.67 (0.68)

0.67 (0.87)

248

131

139

Mean

0.73 (0.81)

0.39 (0.53)

0.50 (0.62)

Median

1.00 (0.84)

0.60 (0.58)

0.65 (0.54)

230
 = 21.55*** (0.302)

128
 = 54.63*** (23.05***)

114
 = 137.95*** (33.02***)

Test of difference between
Period 1, Period 2 and Period 3

High SO: > 50%

N

 2 = 51.49*** (10.15***)

Medium SO: 20%–50%

N

 2 = 45.63*** (3.46)

Low SO: < 20%

N

Test of difference between High
SO, Medium SO and Low SO

2

2
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2

 2 = 6.03 (4.34)

5.1.2. Abnormal Trading Volumes
Kalay (1982) argues that the smaller-than-dividend stock price drop on the exdividend day would provide profitable arbitrage opportunities for short-term
traders. In that case, the tax hypothesis cannot fully explain the ex-day price
behaviour since short-term traders are not subject to the differential taxation of
dividends and capital gains. The presence of short-term trading activity around the
ex-day can be confirmed by the significance of abnormal trading volumes.
Empirical studies have reported the existence of short-term traders in complicating
the ex-day stock price. Documenting positive abnormal volumes around the ex-days
during the period of 1 January 1970 to 31 December 1981 in the US, Lakonishok
and Vermaelen (1986) argue that the presence of short-term trading makes it
difficult to verify the tax hypothesis. Similarly, Athanassakos and Fowler (1993)
provide evidence of short-term trading around the ex-days in the Canadian market.
In the Asian market, short-term trading activity is shown to be prevalent in Japan
by Kato and Loewenstein (1995). Using the traditional event study method, this
section provides results of abnormal trading volumes around the ex-days to test the
following hypothesis:
H4: Abnormal volumes in all three sub-periods are greater than zero.

As shown in Table 5.5, abnormal trading volumes are statistically significant on
most of the days around the ex-days. Only day 3 of Period 1 and days 1 and 4 of
Period 3 have insignificant abnormal trading volumes. Consistent with the
argument by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), this result shows that there exist
short-term traders buying and selling abnormally around the ex-days. However, it
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is not clear at this stage whether abnormal volume is the result of dividend capture
or dividend avoidance trading. In an attempt to answer this question, abnormal
returns are examined in this study. Dividend capture is expected to result in positive
abnormal returns before the ex-days and negative abnormal returns after the exdays (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986; Lasfer, 1995). The pattern of abnormal
returns is expected to be reversed if dividend avoidance strategy is executed.
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Table 5.5: Abnormal Trading Volumes around the Ex-dividend Days
This table presents daily abnormal trading volume covering three sub-periods of the whole sample from 1 January 2006 to 31 December
2012. The three periods are divided based on different levels of dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. For each period, daily abnormal
trading volumes are calculated for a trading window of 11 days around the ex-dividend day covering five days before and five days after the
ex-day. An ex-dividend day is eliminated from the abnormal trading volume analysis if any observation in the control period of (–45, –15)
and (+15, +45) is missing. This leaves a data set of 1,373 observations. t-values are given in parentheses, *, **, *** denote significance at the
10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.

Cum day
–1

Ex day
0

1

2

3

4

5

N=676
0.65***
0.41***
0.70***
0.73***
(6.43)
(4.03)
(7.00)
(7.25)
Panel B: Daily abnormal volume Period 2

0.90***
(8.99)

0.50***
(5.01)

0.52***
(5.19)

0.35***
(3.52)

0.16
(1.61)

0.19*
(1.90)

0.16
(1.55)

N=339
0.32***
0.29***
0.45***
0.46***
(7.19)
(6.50)
(10.01)
(10.29)
Panel C: Daily abnormal volume Period 3

0.43***
(9.59)

0.26***
(5.90)

0.21***
(4.44)

0.18***
(3.99)

0.17***
(3.82)

0.20***
(4.40)

0.16***
(3.54)

1.16***
(8.45)

0.39***
(2.86)

0.16
(1.13)

0.27**
(1.98)

0.27**
(1.96)

0.03
(0.21)

0.32**
(2.31)

–5
–4
–3
–2
Panel A: Daily abnormal volume Period 1

N = 358
0.60***
(4.36)

0.55***
(3.97)

0.61***
(4.37)

0.59***
(4.31)
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5.1.2.1. Cumulative Abnormal Volumes
The analysis of abnormal trading volumes in the previous section exhibits a
significantly higher level of trading activities on most days of the cum- and exdividend periods compared to these in the control period. In order to test whether
such trading is affected by tax heterogeneity and dividend yields, the cumulative
abnormal volumes (CAV) in three sub-periods is examined. CAV has been used as
a tool to study the overall level of trading around the ex-days by Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1986), Michaely and Vila (1996), Graham et al. (2003) and Zhang et
al. (2008). Figure 5.1 presents CAV for the 11-day event window period
encompassing the ex-dividend day. The CAV for day t in the event window is the
sum of AV occurring from day –5 leading up to day t. As predicted by the tax
heterogeneity argument of Michaely and Vila (1995), an increase in abnormal
volumes is expected in Period 2 and Period 3 where the difference between
dividends and capital gains tax is widened. The following hypothesis is tested:
H7: Abnormal volumes are higher after 1 July 2010.
As depicted in Figure 5.1, the CAV in Period 2 and Period 3 are not greater than in
Period 1. Despite the widest gap between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax
rate in Period 2, the CAV in this period is even smaller than the CAV in Period 1
or Period 3. Altogether, Hypothesis H7 is rejected. This result indicates that the
level of abnormal trading is not affected by the differential tax treatment on
dividend income and capital gains income. On the other hand, the lowest level of
CAV in Period 2 where investors are to pay tax on both dividends and capital gains
suggests that trading around the ex-day is significantly affected by the total tax that
investors have to pay. The highest CAV in Period 1 together with the medium CAV
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in Period 3 also supports this view. One possible explanation is that investors
engaging in short-term trading in Vietnam may not be confined to those who pay
no tax on either dividends or capital gains. This is consistent with the finding of
Koski and Scruggs (1998) that short-term traders are not only tax-neutral
institutions as argued by Kalay (1982) but also taxable individuals and corporations.
When taxable individuals and corporations engage in short-term trading around the
ex-days, a high level of tax on dividends and capital gains would discourage
investors to trade.
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Figure 5.1: Cumulative Abnormal Volume for Five Days around the Ex-dividend
Days
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) of Vietnamese listed
companies on the HOSE for the sample period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012.
CAV is calculated for the 11-day event window period encompassing the ex-dividend day.
CAV for day t in the event window is the sum of AV occurring from day –5 leading up to
day t. P1 is the graph for Period 1 from 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010 (t d=tg=0%), P2 is
the graph for Period 2 from 1 July 2010 to 31 July 2011 (t d=5%; tg=20%), P3 is the graph
for Period 3 from 1 August 2011 to 31 December 2012 (td=0%; tg=10%).
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The mean CAV in each sub-period is presented in Table 5.6. CAV is also divided
based on the level of dividend yield. The mean CAVs are then compared among
high, medium and low dividend yield groups to test Hypothesis H5a: Abnormal
trading volumes are positively correlated to dividend yield. Using the full sample,
Period 1 has the highest mean CAV at 3.120, followed by Period 3 at 2.608 and
Period 2 at 0.991. This summary is consistent with the pattern in Figure 5.1 and is
confirmed by the Kruskal–Wallis test that the difference in the CAV between three
sub-samples is statistically significant (  2 =13.78, p<0.01). Moreover, within each
sub-period, the CAV of the high dividend yield group is always the highest and the
most significant. For example, in Period 1, the mean CAV of stocks with high
dividend yield is 4.518, much higher than the mean CAV of 1.397 of stocks with
medium yield (t=4.20, p<0.001; z= 2.03, p<0.01) and the mean CAV of 1.743 of
stocks with low dividend yield (t=3.86, p<0.001;z=1.86, p<0.05). Hypothesis H5a
is, therefore, accepted. The finding of trading concentrated on high dividend yield
stocks is consistent with the argument of Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) that
transaction cost is proportionally lower for high-yielding stocks.
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Table 5.6: Cumulative Abnormal Volumes
This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the full sample and CAV in each period partitioned based on the level
of dividend yield. Following Graham et al. (2003) and Zhang et al. (2008), dividend yield is low if it is smaller than two percent, dividend
yield is medium if it is from two to four percent and dividend yield is high if it is greater than four percent. t-values are given in parentheses.
The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Panel A: CAV of the full sample
Period 1
CAV
3.120***
(7.32)

Period 2
N

Period 3

CAV

676

N

0.991*

CAV
2.608***

339

(1.83)

(2.86)

N

Test of difference between
Period 1, Period 2 and Period 3

358

 2 =13.78***

Panel B: CAV by dividend yield
Period 1
Dividend Yield (DY)

CAV
Low
Medium

1.743

Period 2
N

CAV

***

(4.21)
1.397***

0.372

173

(0.23)
0.584

146

(3.72)
High

4.518***

N
65
149

(0.41)
1.791***

357

(4.95)
Test of difference between
Low, Medium and High DY

Period 3

(3.44)

 2 = 17.30***

 2 = 8.10**
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CAV
1.044
(1.4)
1.559***

N
117
120

(2.24)
125

5.162***
(2.35)

 2 = 10.25**
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5.1.2.2. Abnormal Volumes with State Ownership
This section provides the results on abnormal trading volumes around the ex-days
based on the level of state ownership. Throughout the three periods, the level of
abnormal trading for stocks with high state ownership is less significant compared
to stocks with medium and low state ownership. While abnormal volumes of stocks
with medium and low state ownership are positive and significant on most days
around the ex-days, abnormal volumes of stocks with high state ownership are only
significant for day –4 and 0 in Period 1; day –5, –2, –1 and 0 in Period 2 and day –
4, –3 and –1 in Period 3. Furthermore, trading on stocks with high state ownership
occurs mainly before the ex-days. There are different explanations for this trading
pattern of stocks with high state ownership. First, traders in stocks with high state
ownership tend to be long-term investors with their decisions focused on timing of
the trade, that is, whether to trade before or on the ex-dividend days. Green (1980)
argues that delaying a transaction might be more costly than speeding up a
transaction. It follows that investors who have decided to buy or sell would do so
before the ex-days, thereby creating a significant increase in trading volumes before
the ex-days. Second, the abnormal trading activity before the ex-day can also be
triggered by short-term traders who wish to conduct round-trip trades. However,
after the ex-days, if their increased orders to trade are not matched by the market,
the level of transaction in the market would still be at the “normal” level. To identify
whether the observed abnormal volumes of stocks with high state ownership before
the ex-days are caused by short-term or long-term traders, the current study
investigates the relation between trading volumes and transaction costs. Long-term
investors consider transaction costs as fixed and are indifferent between various
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transaction cost levels (Elton and Gruber, 1970) while short-term traders are much
more sensitive to transaction cost changes (Kalay, 1982). The analogous analysis
can be performed on stocks with medium and low level of state ownership to reveal
the identity of traders around the ex-days.
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Table 5.7: Abnormal Trading Volumes by State Ownership
The table below presents daily abnormal trading volume covering three periods of the whole sample from 1 January 2006 to 31 December
2012. The three periods are divided based on different levels of dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. Abnormal volumes in each
period are further partitioned based on the level of state ownership. Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Wei et al. (2003), state ownership
(SO) is high, medium and low if the State holds more than 50 percent, from 20 to 50 percent and smaller than 20 percent of the total number
of shares in the company respectively. Daily abnormal trading volumes are calculated for a trading window of 11 days around the ex-dividend
day covering five days before and five days after the ex-day. An ex-dividend day is eliminated from the abnormal trading volume analysis if
any observation in the control period of (–45, –15) and (+15, +45) is missing. The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1
percent level respectively.

–5

–4

–3

–2

Cum day
–1

Ex day
0

1

2

3

4

5

Panel A: Daily abnormal volumes Period 1 (N=676)
High SO
(N=207)
Medium SO
(N=244)
Low SO
(N=225)

–0.03

0.30**

0.12

–0.02

0.14

0.23***

0.01

0.12

–0.03

0.12

0.02

(–0.33)
0.63***

(2.25)
0.31***

(1.16)
0.64***

(–0.20)
1.07***

(1.40)
1.10***

(2.99)
0.32***

(0.08)
0.42***

(1.21)
0.24**

(–0.27)
0.15

(1.17)
0.38***

(0.21)
0.29***

(6.30)
1.22***

(3.13)
0.62***

(6.31)
1.24***

(10.68)
1.09***

(10.92)
1.39***

(3.17)
0.80***

(4.17)
0.99***

(2.34)
0.62***

(1.45)
0.32***

(3.82)
0.10

(2.89)
0.14

(12.14)

(6.17)

(12.33)

(10.83)

(13.80)

(7.92)

(9.88)

(6.12)

(3.17)

(0.98)

(1.39)
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Table 5.7 - Continued

–5

–4

–3

Cum day

Ex day

–2

–1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Panel B: Daily abnormal volumes Period 2 (N=339)
High SO
(N=85)
Medium SO
(N=127)
Low SO
(N=127)

0.18***

0.05

0.04

0.22***

0.21***

0.09**

0.07

0.02

0.07

0.04

0.04

(4.14)

(1.14)

(0.97)

(4.93)

(4.62)

(1.98)

(1.62)

(0.41)

(1.48)

(0.99)

(0.94)

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

0.26***

0.36

0.37

0.82

0.76

0.72

0.47

0.31

0.36

0.24

0.37

(7.98)

(8.29)

(18.44)

(17.12)

(16.23)

(10.56)

(7.07)

(8.02)

(5.46)

(8.26)

(5.85)

0.41***

0.43***

0.34***

0.40***

0.36***

0.23***

0.20***

0.29***

0.20***

0.18***

0.17***

(9.19)

(9.66)

(7.58)

(8.93)

(8.06)

(5.20)

(4.58)

(6.47)

(4.42)

(3.98)

(3.79)

Panel C: Daily abnormal volumes Period 3 (N=358)
0.13

0.28**

0.31**

0.15

0.46***

0.11

0.07

0.13

0.01

0.04

0.11

(0.98)

(2.00)

(2.29)

(1.07)

(3.36)

(0.79)

(0.49)

(0.93)

(0.06)

(0.30)

(0.81)

Medium SO
(N=135)

1.37***

1.15***

1.49***

0.63***

0.96***

0.73***

0.18

0.26*

0.45***

0.04

0.21

(9.95)

(8.40)

(10.87)

(4.57)

(7.01)

(5.34)

(1.32)

(1.89)

(3.25)

(0.28)

(1.51)

Low SO
(N=112)

0.46***

0.35**

0.21

0.97***

0.36***

0.40***

0.21

0.41***

0.38***

0.01

0.58***

(3.37)

(2.52)

(1.54)

(7.06)

(2.66)

(2.94)

(1.57)

(2.99)

(2.73)

(0.08)

(4.23)

High SO
(N=111)
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5.1.3. Abnormal Returns
The analysis of abnormal returns around the ex-days was first used by Lakonishok
and Vermaelen (1986) to identify the preference of investors toward dividends. It
was then followed by Lasfer (1995) and Graham et al. (2003). Table 5.8 provides
results on excess returns around the ex-days for the three sub-periods to test
Hypothesis H6: Abnormal returns are positive before the ex-days and negative on
and after the ex-days. On day –5 and –4 in Period 1, day –1 in Period 2 and day –5
and –2 in Period 3, the excess returns are significantly positive. On certain days in
each period such as day –2 in Period 1 and day –3 in Period 2, excess returns are
negative but not statistically significant. From the ex-day onward, excess returns
are consistently negative and significant. Altogether, Hypothesis H6 is accepted.
According to Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), the positive excess return before
the ex-days is an indicator of increased buying pressure created by investors seeking
to capture dividends. If this is the case, the desire of these investors to sell during
the ex-dividend period (i.e. increased selling pressure) would be reflected through
negative excess returns. Results in the previous section shows that there exist some
differences in the abnormal trading volumes among stocks at varying levels of state
ownership. Therefore, it would be worth examining the abnormal returns based on
state ownership to better understand the trading behaviour around the ex-days of
investors in the Vietnamese market.
Table 5.9 presents abnormal returns in each period based on three levels of state
ownership. Throughout the three sub-periods, the mean abnormal returns of stocks
with a high level of state ownership are not significant for all days around the ex75

day and on the ex-day itself. This result, together with the insignificant trading
volumes, suggests that stocks with high state ownership are not the target of shortterm traders on the HOSE. On the other hand, stocks at a lower level of state
ownership exhibit the pattern of abnormal returns that is consistent with the shortterm trading hypothesis. Similar to the results found on the full sample in each
period, abnormal returns from stocks with low and medium level of state ownership
are positive before the ex-days and negative on and after the day that stocks go exdividend. This result is consistent with investors in the Vietnamese market
attempting to capture dividends by buying before the ex-days and selling once the
stocks go ex-dividend. Furthermore, the behaviour of abnormal returns consistent
with dividend capture is most evident in stocks with medium and low level of state
ownership. In literature, dividend capture has also been found to be present in
markets such as the NASDAQ (Karpoff and Walkling, 1998) and the Canadian
market (Athanassakos and Fowler, 1993).
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Table 5.8: Abnormal Returns around the Ex-dividend Days
This table presents abnormal returns for the sample period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012. The three sub-periods are divided
based on different levels of dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. Daily abnormal returns are provided for 11 days covering five days
before and after the ex-dividend dates. Abnormal returns are calculated as (RETi,t – rf,t) – (α + β(rm,t – rf,t)) where α and β are estimated from
a market model from day 45 to day 15 before the ex-day and from day 15 to day 45 after the ex-day, rf is the one-year interest rate on

Vietnamese government notes and rm is the daily return of VNINDEX. t-values are given in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.

–5

–4

–3

–2

Cum day

Ex day

–1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Panel A: Daily abnormal volume Period 1
N=695
0.0102***

0.0070*

0.0031

–0.0014

0.0102

–0.0100***

–0.0080***

–0.0063***

–0.0151***

–0.0135***

–0.0054***

(3.13)

(1.89)

(0.72)

(–0.23)

(1.53)

(–4.80)

(–4.89)

(–3.56)

(–3.35)

(–2.58)

(–3.63)

Panel B: Daily abnormal volume Period 2
N=349
0.0008

0.0022

–0.0002

0.0012

0.0059**

–0.0006

–0.0061**

–0.0025*

–0.0040***

–0.0024

–0.0036**

(0.58)

(1.61)

(–1.23)

(0.81)

(2.36)

(–0.41)

(–2.24)

(–1.71)

(–2.75)

(–1.64)

(–2.34)

Panel C: Daily abnormal volume Period 3
N = 369
0.0045***

–0.0008

–5.2E-05

0.00347**

–6.6E-05

–0.0064***

–0.0043***

–0.0020

–0.0034**

–0.0005

–0.0052***

(3.12)

(–0.55)

(–0.003)

(2.51)

(–0.05)

(–21.10)

(–2.69)

(–1.37)

(–2.29)

(–0.35)

(–3.69)

77

Table 5.9: Abnormal Returns by State Ownership
This table presents daily abnormal returns for three sub-periods divided based on different levels of dividends tax rate and capital gains tax
rate. Abnormal returns in each period are further partitioned based on the level of state ownership. Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Wei
et al. (2003), state ownership (SO) is high, medium and low if the State holds more than 50 percent, from 20 to 50 percent and smaller than
20 percent of the total number of shares in the company. t-values are given in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the
10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.

–5

–4

–3

Cum day

Ex day

–2

–1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Panel A: Daily abnormal returns Period 1 (N=695)
High SO
(N=217)
Medium
(N=248)
Low SO
(N=230)

8.13E-05

–0.00041

0.0011

–0.0045

7.5E.06

0.00035

2.3E-05

4.9E-06

0.0001

0.0003

2.1E-05

(0.02)

(–0.01)

(0.29)

(–0.72)

(0.001)

(0.17)

(0.05)

(0.007)

(0.12)

(1.06)

(0.04)

–0.0237

–0.0057

–0.0315

–0.0179

0.0173

***

(3.31)
0.0121

**

(2.17)

0.0058

**

(2.17)
0.0153

**

(2.09)

0.0058

6.3E-06

0.0046

(1.58)

(0.05)

(1.23)

0.0021

7.9E-06

0.0295

(1.35)

(0.04)

(1.69)

*

***

***

(–2.79)

(–3.17)

–0.0080

–0.0180

**

(–2.57)
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**

(–2.56)

–0.0085

***

(–2.85)
–0.0099

***

(–3.79)

***

***

–0.0025**

(–4.27)

(–2.83)

(–2.47)

–0.0118

–0.0218

–0.0123

**

(–2.16)

**

(–2.41)

(–1.58)

Table 5.9 - Continued
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0
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Panel B: Daily abnormal returns Period 2 (N=349)
High SO (N=90)
Medium SO
(N=131)
Low SO (N=128)

1.8E-05

0.0007

–0.0004

8.1E-06

7.3E-05

1.3E-05

–6.3E-06

1.7E-05

0.0003

–1.2E-06

8.3E-06

(0.07)

(1.01)

(–1.35)

(0.17)

(1.12)

(0.29)

(–0.04)

(0.25)

(1.17)

(–0.06)

(0.02)

0.0021

0.0019

–0.0001

0.0034

0.0083**

–0.0002

–0.0025*

–0.0057*

–0.0031**

–0.0007

–0.0041*

(1.13)

(0.86)

(–0.75)

(1.34)

(2.35)

(–0.78)

(–1.92)

(–1.83)

(–2.35)

(–1.27)

(–1.79)

2.2E-05

0.0036

0.0008

0.0067

(0.91)

(1.43)

(1.21)

(1.89)

*

0.0075

**

–0.0014

–0.0141

***

–0.0010

–0.0078

***

–0.0058

*

–0.0056**

(2.57)

(–1.35)

(–2.79)

(–1.07)

(–2.93)

(–1.73)

(–2.13)

Panel C: Daily abnormal returns Period 3 (N=369)
High SO
(N=116)
Medium SO
(N=139)
Low SO (N=114)

–1.2E-06

–5.1E-05

–0.0007

–2.3E-06

7.2E-05

7.5E-06

–0.0002

8.9E-05

–5.3E-05

–0.0027

1.5E-05

(–0.05)

(0.19)

(–0.23)

(–0.17)

(0.79)

(1.03)

(–0.27)

(0.47)

(–0.73)

(–1.37)

(0.41)

0.0029**

–0.0009

2.5E-05

0.0051**

9.9E-05

–0.0081***

–0.0077***

–0.009***

–0.0029***

–0.0001

–0.0037**

(2.35)

(–0.73)

(0.39)

(2.29)

(0.17)

(–2.77)

(–2.85)

(–2.71)

(–2.81)

(–0.97)

(–1.98)

0.0110***

–0.0014

0.0005

0.0050**

–0.0004

–0.0108***

–0.0043***

–0.0045

–0.0074***

–0.0013

–0.0123***

(2.71)

(–1.23)

(0.78)

(2.34)

(–0.79)

(–2.58)

(–2.64)

(–1.27)

(–3.15)

(–1.53)

(–2.75)
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5.2. Regression Analysis
5.2.1. Regression Analysis on Ex-day Drop-off Ratios
Panel A of Table 5.10 reports the results of regression analysis on drop-off ratios.
Using the full sample from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012, three estimation
techniques, OLS, robust and panel methods, are employed. There is no significant
deviation in the results of the three methods. The insignificant estimates of the two
dummy variables demonstrate that the drop-off ratios do not change significantly
over the three sub-periods. This result is consistent with what has been found in the
mean drop-off ratios of the three sub-periods using univariate analysis. On the other
hand, the positive and significant estimate of  2 shows that drop-off ratio is higher
for stocks with higher state ownership. And since a higher drop-off ratio exhibits a
higher market value of dividends, this result from regression analysis indicates that
the market value of dividends in the Vietnamese market is not significantly affected
by the relative difference between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate but
by the level of state ownership in the firm. Therefore, Hypothesis H8: There is a
relationship between state ownership and the market value of dividends is accepted.
Panel B of Table 5.10 shows regression results on observations with high state
ownership. The estimates of the two dummy variables are consistently positive and
significant using all three estimation methods, indicating that the market value of
dividends of stocks with high state ownership is significantly higher when
dividends are more tax advantaged relative to capital gains. This result is consistent
with the findings from univariate analysis that drop-off ratios of stocks with high
state ownership are not statistically different from one in Period 1 but are
significantly greater than one in both Period 2 and Period 3. Panel C and Panel D
80

of Table 5.10 present regression estimates on observations with medium and low
state ownership respectively and the overall results are not supportive of the
argument by Elton and Gruber (1970) since most of the estimates of the dummy
variables for Period 2 and Period 3 are not significantly positive. The only result
that is consistent with the tax hypothesis is the estimate of the dummy variable for
Period 3 using panel regression presented in Panel C of Table 5.10. The estimate of

 4 is 1.322 and is statistically significant at the one percent level, showing that the
market value of dividends of stocks with medium state ownership is significantly
higher in Period 3 than in Period 1. Overall, the impact of taxes on the market value
of dividends is significant for stocks with high state ownership, but not for stocks
with medium or low state ownership.
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Table 5.10: Regression Analysis on Ex-day Drop-off Ratios
This table reports estimates of the regression on drop-off ratios (DR) for the full sample period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012.
The dependent variable DR is calculated as the ratio of stock price decrease on the ex-day (Pcum-Pex) to dividend (D). The control variables
are (1) Log (Market-Capi,t) calculated as the natural logarithm of Market Capitalisation of stock i on the ex-day t, (2) DYi,t (Dividend Yield)
calculated as Dividend Per Share divided by stock price on the cum-day, (3) State ownership is state share ownership as of the ex-dividend
day, (4) Dummy

if period 2

which takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made between 1 July 2010 and 31 July 2011 and zero

otherwise, (5) Dummy if period 3 which takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made after 1 August 2011 and zero otherwise. The
regression is estimated using OLS, robust and panel method. Only 1,398 out of 1,413 observations of the data set on abnormal returns are
included in the panel regression since 24 stocks offer only one observation over the sample period and therefore are eliminated. The reported
estimates for OLS method are adjusted using Newey-West correction to account for heteroskedasticy and autocorrelation in the residuals.
The regression estimates for the full sample, for observations with high and low state ownership using panel regression are from the fixed
effects model since the Hausman test proves that the null hypothesis of random effect is rejected at the 5 percent level. The regression
estimates for observation with medium state ownership using panel regression are from the random effects model since the Hausman test
proves that the null hypothesis of random effect cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. The t-statistic for OLS and panel method and the
Chi-square statistic for robust method are provided in parentheses.
The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
DRi,t = α + β0Log (Market-Capi,t) + β1DYi,t + β2State Ownershipi,t + β3Dummyif period 2 + β4 Dummy if period 3 + ε.
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Table 5.10 - Continued
Method

DR



0

1

2

3

4

R2

Obs

11.57%

1,413

6.39%

1,413

40.72%

1,389

34.89%

423

24.09%

423

38.53%

415

Panel A: Regression estimates for the full sample
OLS

Robust

Panel

0.051

–0.015

2.001

3.443***

0.079

0.025

(0.03)

(–0.23)

(1.25)

(5.76)

(0.43)

(0.14)

0.629

–0.021

0.537

1.946***

0.092

0.134

(1.12)

(0.90)

(0.32)

(2701.21)

(1.88)

(3.5)

4.774*

–0.062

0.832

6.010***

0.117

0.270

(1.85)

(–1.28)

(0.40)

(7.66)

(0.64)

(0.25)

Panel B: Regression estimates for observations with high state ownership
OLS

Robust

Panel

–2.593***

0.013

0.657

6.138***

1.196***

0.774***

(–3.36)

(0.55)

(0.58)

(7.53)

(7.15)

(6.51)

–7.089***

0.017

1.239

12.697***

0.1734*

0.857***

(82.94)

(0.45)

(1.12)

(119.72)

(3.78)

(89.08)

–4.994***

0.048**

1.861**

8.258***

1.309***

0.789***

(–5.22)

(2.10)

(2.00)

(8.33)

(11.33)

(5.17)
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Method

DR



0

1

2

3

4

R2

Obs

14.25%

518

17.58%

518

11.43%

510

Panel C: Regression estimates for observations with medium state ownership
OLS

Robust

Panel

–7.918

0.101

7.045*

11.711***

–0.7215

–0.349

(–1.54)

(0.59)

(1.75)

(3.62)

(–1.75)

(–0.75)

–0.974***

–0.031

–0.108

3.448***

0.074

0.054

(29.01)

(0.24)

(0.14)

(195.23)

(1.12)

(1.03)

–4.264

–0.104

–1.923

20.923***

0.298

1.322***

(–1.13)

(–1.12)

(–0.50)

(3.550)

(0.91)

(3.46)

Panel D: Regression estimates for observations with low state ownership
OLS

Robust

Panel

0.855

–0.069

–1.510

16.180***

–0.1532

0.980

(0.65)

(0.36)

(0.61)

(3.91)

(–0.74)

(0.16)

0.281

0.001

1.077

8.083***

–0.784**

–0.205

(0.84)

(0.01)

(0.29)

(112.23)

(37.42)

(0.18)

1.428

–0.063

–1.049

11.706***

0.002

0.982

(0.55)

(–0.66)

(–0.28)

(6.01)

(0.01)

(0.98)

84

11.17%

472

15.78%

472

8.30%

455

5.2.2. Regression Analysis on Ex-day Abnormal Returns
Ex-day abnormal returns are used in conjunction with drop-off ratios as a dependent
variable in regression analysis since drop-off ratios might suffer from
heteroskedasticity problems (Eades et al., 1984). Ex-day abnormal returns indicate
the market value of dividends in the opposite way that ex-day drop-off ratios do. A
higher market value of dividends is associated with a higher drop-off ratio but with
a lower ex-day abnormal return. Panel A of Table 5.11 reports regression estimates
on the ex-day abnormal returns for the full sample. The negative and significant
estimate of the variable State across the three regression methods is consistent with
the previous finding that the market value of dividends is higher for stocks with
higher state ownership. Therefore, Hypothesis H8: There is a relationship between
state ownership and the market value of dividends is accepted. The insignificant
estimates of the two dummy variables using OLS and panel methods are also
consistent with these from regressions which used the ex-day drop-off ratios in the
previous section. The only result that supports the tax hypothesis is the estimate of
the dummy variable for Period 3 from robust regression. The estimate of  4 is
negative and significant with a value of –0.0085. Elton and Gruber (1970) argue
that when dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, the market value
of dividends should increase when the gap between dividends tax rate and capital
gains tax rate is reduced. When dividends are taxed at a lower rate than capital
gains, the case should be reversed and the market value of dividends should increase
when the difference between the two tax rates are widened. In Vietnam, in Period
1, there was no tax on either dividends or capital gains. In Period 3, dividends were
subject to no tax and capital gains were taxed at 10 percent. Moreover, a lower ex85

day abnormal return indicates a higher market value of dividends; therefore, the
negative and significant estimate of  4 from robust regression shows that market
value of dividends is higher in Period 3 than in Period 1. Nonetheless, Period 2
experienced a wider gap between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rates but
the estimate of 3 from robust regression is neither negative nor significant.
Overall, the results suggest that the market value of dividends is not responsive to
a change in relevant tax regime; therefore, the tax hypothesis appears to receive
little support in the Vietnamese market.
Panel B of Table 5.11 presents regression results on observations with high state
ownership. Results from univariate analysis show that drop-off ratios of stocks with
high state ownership are not statistically different from one in Period 1. Moreover,
drop-off ratios are greater than one in both Period 2 and Period 3. The inference of
these results is that the market value of dividends paid from stocks with high state
ownership is higher when dividends are taxed at a lower rate than capital gains
compared to when dividends and capital gains are equally taxed. Regression
estimates for observations with high state ownership also confirm this pattern. The
coefficients on the two dummy variables representing Period 2 and Period 3 are
significantly negative. Regressions are also performed on observations with
medium and low state ownership. However, Panel C and Panel D of Table 5.11
show that the results do not support the tax hypothesis. The coefficients on dummy
variables for Period 2 and Period 3 are insignificant for both medium and low state
ownership.
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Table 5.11: Regression Analysis on Ex-day Abnormal Returns
This table reports estimates of the regression on ex-day abnormal returns for the full sample period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December
2012. The dependent variable abnormal return is calculated as the daily return of the stock on the ex-dividend day t minus its expected return
estimated by CAPM. The control variables are (1) Log (Market-Capi,t) calculated as the natural logarithm of Market Capitalisation of stock

i on the ex-day t, (2) DYi,t (Dividend Yield) calculated as Dividend Per Share divided by stock price on the cum-day, (3) State ownership
is state share ownership as of the ex-dividend day, (4) Dummy if period 2 which takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made between
1 July 2010 and 31 July 2011 and zero otherwise, (5) Dummy if period 3 which takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made after 1
August 2011 and zero otherwise. The regression is estimated using OLS, robust and panel method. Only 1,389 out of 1,413 observations of
the data set on abnormal returns are included in the panel regression since 24 stocks offer only one observation over the sample period and
therefore are eliminated. The reported estimates for OLS method are adjusted using Newey-West correction to account for heteroskedasticy
and autocorrelation in the residuals. The regression estimates for the full sample, for observations with medium and low state ownership
using panel regression are from the fixed effects model since the Hausman test proves that the null hypothesis of random effect is rejected at
the 5 percent level. The regression estimates for observation with high state ownership using panel regression are from the random effects
model since the Hausman test proves that the null hypothesis of random effect cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. The t-statistic for
OLS and panel method and the Chi-square statistic for robust method are provided in parentheses.
The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
ABRETi,t = α + β0Log (Market-Capi,t) + β1DYi,t + β2State Ownershipi,t + β3Dummyif period 2 + β4 Dummy if period 3 + ε.
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Table 5.11 - Continued
Method

ABRET



0

1

2

3

4

R2

Obs

13.22%

1,413

16.01%

1,413

17.25%

1,389

33.65%

423

34.64%

423

25.53%

415

Panel A: Regression estimates for the full sample
OLS

Robust

Panel

–0.053**

0.002**

–0.001

–0.033***

0.002

0.002

(–2.03)

(2.32)

(–0.01)

(3.32)

(0.38)

(0.52)

–0.017

0.001*

0.021

–0041***

0.0014

–0.0085***

(1.06)

(3.70)

(0.71)

(168.43)

(0.6)

(20.10)

0.063*

–0.001

–0.049*

–0.105***

0.001

0.007

(1.76)

(–0.93)

(–1.69)

(–7.60)

(1.06)

(1.47)

Panel B: Regression estimates for observations with high state ownership
OLS

Robust

Panel

0.148***

0.0004

–0.015

–0.280***

–0.025***

–0.013**

(3.67)

(0.32)

(–0.35)

(–7.92)

(–3.89)

(–2.41)

0.151***

0.001

0.018

–0.332***

–0.027***

–0.022***

(28.7)

(2.7)

(0.23)

(572.61)

(98.45)

(46.7)

0.183***

–0.001

–0.034

–0.287***

–0.023***

–0.008*

(4.75)

(–0.57)

(–0.69)

(–11.47)

(–5.39)

(–1.69)

88

Table 5.11 - Continued
Method

ABRET



0

1

2

3

4

R2

Obs

23.35%

518

16.86%

518

11.74%

510

26.96%

472

32.43%

472

26.60%

455

Panel C: Regression estimates for observations with medium state ownership
OLS

Robust

Panel

–0.060

0.002

–0.0002

–0.278***

0.041***

0.009

(–1.21)

(1.16)

(–0.00)

(–4.97)

(4.23)

(0.91)

–0.023

0.001

0.026

–0.177***

0.029***

–0.0002

(0.523)

(0.491)

(0.616)

(73.78)

(73.07)

(0.00)

–0.091

0.001

0.012

–0.330**

0.014

0.090*

(–1.31)

(0.55)

(0.16)

(–2.52)

(0.64)

(1.74)

Panel D: Regression estimates for observations with low state ownership
OLS

Robust

Panel

0.064***

0.0003

–0.020

–0.139***

0.020***

0.021***

(3.92)

(0.08)

(–0.1)

(–3.89)

(3.56)

(9.75)

0.037***

0.003

0.015**

–0.091***

0.011***

0.020***

(33.04)

(1.88)

(2.04)

(729.38)

(192.4)

(605.63)

0.067***

0.001

–0.005

–0.127***

–0.01

0.097***

(5.34)

(0.92)

(–0.55)

(–6.85)

(0.015)

(9.47)

89

5.2.3. Regression Analysis on Abnormal Volumes
Following Michaely and Vila (1995), the cumulative abnormal volumes are used in
regression analysis to examine how abnormal trading volumes are correlated to
transaction costs and dividend yields (Testing of Hypothesis H5a and H5b).
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) argue that short-term trading is concentrated on
high-yielding stocks and abnormal trading volumes are more pronounced when
transaction cost is low. Panel A of Table 5.12 presents the regression estimates for
the full sample. The results are consistent with the prediction of Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1986) with significantly positive coefficients on the variable DY and
significantly negative coefficients on the variable 1/Pcum. These results confirm that
investors trading around the ex-days in the Vietnamese market are far more
attracted to high-yielding stocks than to lower yielding stock and they trade more
when transaction costs are less, leading to the acceptance of Hypothesis H5a:
Abnormal trading volumes are positively correlated to dividend yield and
Hypothesis H5b: Abnormal trading volumes are negatively correlated to
transaction costs. The negative and significant coefficient on the dummy variable
indicating Period 2 shows that abnormal trading volumes in Period 2 are
significantly less than in Period 1. On the other hand, the coefficient on the dummy
variable indicating Period 3 is negative but insignificant using OLS. The robust
method shows that abnormal trading volumes in Period 3 are not significantly
smaller than in Period 1. These results are consistent with the pattern observed in
Figure 5.1 and lead to the rejection of Hypothesis H7: Abnormal trading volumes
are higher after 1 July 2010.
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Regression analysis on the cumulative abnormal volumes is also performed within
different levels of state ownership. Panels B, C and D of Table 5.12 report
regression estimates for observations with high, medium and low state ownership
respectively. While Panels C and D show a significantly negative coefficient on the
variable 1/Pcum, Panel B finds the coefficient on 1/Pcum to be insignificant.21 The
coefficient on the variable DY is positive and significant in all three cases. The
results suggest that regardless of the level of state ownership, trading around the exdays is more pronounced for higher yielding stocks, but for stocks with high state
ownership, trading is unaffected by transaction costs, while for stocks with medium
and low state ownership, higher transaction costs appear to significantly inhibit the
level of trading.

21

It is noted that the mean Pcum is VND 35,848.06. The large coefficients on 1/P cum are expected as
a result.
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Table 5.12: Regression Analysis on Abnormal Volumes
This table reports estimates of the regression on cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) for the full sample period from 1 January 2006 to 31
December 2012. The dependent variable cumulative abnormal volume of stock i for the ex-day event t is calculated as the mean CAV for the
11-day period encompassing the ex-day of this stock. Following Michaely and Vila (1996), the control variables are (1) Log (Market-Capi,t)
calculated as the natural logarithm of Market Capitalisation of stock i on the ex-day t, (2) DYi,t (Dividend Yield) calculated as Dividend Per
Share divided by stock price on the cum-day, (3) State ownership is state share ownership as of the ex-dividend day, (4) Dummy

if period 2

which takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made between 1 July 2010 and 31 July 2011 and zero otherwise, (5) Dummy if period 3
which takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made after 1 August 2011 and zero otherwise. The regression is estimated using
OLS, robust and panel method. Only 1,353 out of 1,373 observations of the data set on cumulative abnormal volumes are included in the
panel regression since 20 stocks offer only one observation over the sample period and therefore are eliminated. The reported estimates for
OLS method are adjusted using Newey-West correction to account for heteroskedasticy and autocorrelation in the residuals. The regression
estimates for the full sample, for observations with high and medium state ownership using panel regression are from the random effects
model since the Hausman test proves that the null hypothesis of random effect cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. The regression
estimates for observation with low state ownership using panel regression are from the fixed effects model since the Hausman test proves
that the null hypothesis of random effect is rejected at the 5 percent level. The t-statistic for OLS and panel method and the Chi-square
statistic for robust method are provided in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
CAVi,t= α + β0Log (Market-Capi,t) + β1DYi,t + β2 Betai,t + β3 1/Pcum i,t + β4State Ownershipi,t + β5Dummy if period 2 + β6 Dummy if period 3 + ε.
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Table 5.12 - Continued

Method

CAV



0

1

2

3

4

5

6

R2

Obs

18.20%

1,373

15.83%

1,373

30.97%

1,353

19.82%

403

15.48%

403

23.19%

391

Panel A: Regression estimates for the full sample
OLS

Robust

Panel

3.029

–0.072

27.970***

–0.675

–55,272***

1.818

–2.572**

–0.431

(0.67)

(–0.43)

(3.51)

(–1.04)

(–3.80)

(0.80)

(–2.03)

(–0.23)

1.591

–0.033

41.802***

0.041

–33,692.7**

–0.231

–1.358**

–0.072

(1.19)

(0.39)

(173.28)

(0.11)

(128.21)

(0.5)

(36.94)

(0.09)

–4.780

0.251

24.696***

–0.564

–41,905*

2.444

–6.289***

–3.322*

(–0.41)

(0.95)

(4.97)

(–1.05)

(–2.17)

(0.23)

(–4.35)

(–1.76)

Panel B: Regression estimates for observations with high state ownership
OLS

Robust

Panel

13.878

–0.464*

186.26*

–1.869

–15,538.5

–4.361

–3.25

3.149

(1.46)

(–1.71)

(1.9)

(–1.21)

(–0.35)

(–0.58)

(–1.4)

(0.88)

0.332

–0.025

77.913***

–0.025

–1,722.58

–2.316***

–2.491***

1.970***

(0.05)

(0.29)

(475.51)

(0.06)

(0.3)

(9.4)

(130.72)

(65.49)

–40.3417

–0.522

69.063***

–2.397

24.34

–1.302

–1.525*

–2.984***

(–0.94)

(–0.55)

(3.1)

(–1.62)

(1.05)

(–0.06)

(–1.86)

(–3.35)
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Table 5.12 – Continued
Method

CAV



0

1

3

2

4

5

6

R2

Obs

9.71%

506

11.60%

506

37.78%

501

16.39%

464

8.13%

464

17.86%

452

Panel C: Regression estimates for observations with medium state ownership
OLS

Robust

Panel

3.900

–0.075

35.289**

–0.003

–35,143***

–3.209

0.636

0.465

(0.32)

(–0.19)

(2.19)

(–0.01)

(–2.84)

(–0.45)

(0.45)

(0.43)

–2.03*

0.080*

10.855***

0.068

–13,947***

–0.995

0.364

1.207***

(3.47)

(4.46)

(29.51)

(0.58)

(31.82)

(1.09)

(2.90)

(55.24)

–13.303

0.290

35.949*

0.213

–49,998*

–1.825

–1.725

0.856

(–1.03)

(0.78)

(1.85)

(0.29)

(–1.78)

(–0.84)

(–0.72)

(0.58)

Panel D: Regression estimates for observations with low state ownership
OLS

Robust

Panel

–0.568

0.111

66.778***

–0.554

–40,751**

5.8916

–2.838

–2.584**

(–0.07)

(0.37)

(3.42)

(–0.93)

(–2.27)

(0.55)

(–1.5)

(–2.09)

3.569

–0.078

32.771**

–0.320

–25,042**

0.3513

–2.001**

–1.560**

(0.98)

(0.34)

(24.75)

(0.92)

(24.5)

(0.01)

(13.87)

(8.5)

–1.310

0.172

32.804***

0.445

–20,348*

10.46

–5.842***

–6.323***

(–0.24)

(0.86)

(2.85)

(0.91)

(–1.73)

(1.23)

(–4.95)

(–5.01)
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5.3. Robustness Tests
In this section, several tests are performed to verify the robustness of the thesis’s
main findings. The primary purpose of a robustness test is to examine how core
regression estimates behave under model uncertainty (Lu and White, 2014).
According to Plumper and Neumayer (2012), some of the most common robustness
tests are the use of additional variables, alternative measures of dependent or
independent variables and changes in the sample. In this study, first, an examination
is conducted to determine whether the results are sensitive to endogeneity
associated with the variable state ownership. In addition, to confirm whether the
results on how dividend value is affected are influenced by sample selection, the
sample is divided based on state ownership into above-median state ownership subsample and below-median state ownership sub-sample to check how the regression
results on ex-day drop-off ratios and ex-day abnormal returns might be affected.
5.3.1. Endogeneity
Eom et al. (2007) argue that in event studies, critical variables might be
endogenously determined. In those cases, the use of panel-data analysis helps to
control for endogenous variables. According to Mundlak (1978), endogeneity exists
in fixed effects panel-data model but not in random effects model. Baltagi et al.
(2003) further argue that if the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of zero
conditional mean of errors, regression estimates should be from the fixed effects
model. This is also consistent with the argument by Eom et al. (2007) that if the
Hausman test does not reject the random effect, then endogeneity does not exist.
On the other hand, if the Hausman test rejects random effects specification,
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endogeneity is an issue and estimators from the fixed effects model will be robust
to endogeneity. Therefore, the use of panel-data regressions on drop-off ratios,
abnormal returns and abnormal volumes with the support of the Hausman test in
previous sections already accounts for endogeneity problems. And since the results
from panel-data regressions are not significantly different from OLS regression, our
results appear to be robust to endogeneity.
The robustness of the results subject to the endogenous variable state ownership
can also be examined using instrumental variable in two-stage least squares
regressions (Cornett et al., 2009). Dinc (2005) argues that the lagged variables are
uncorrelated with the error terms in the current regression. Therefore, following
Cornett et al. (2009), in the first stage, state ownership is regressed using 3-year
lagged state ownership, the company’s size, dividend yield and payout ratio. The
second stage uses the fitted values of state ownership from the first stage as an
instrumental variable to regress on ex-day drop-off ratios, abnormal returns and
cumulative abnormal volumes. Finally, the Hausman test is performed to identify
whether there exists significant difference between the coefficients of ordinary least
squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS). The Hausman tests prove that
there is no significant difference between OLS estimates and 2SLS estimates for
the regressions on ex-day drop-off ratios, abnormal returns and cumulative
abnormal volumes, indicating that theresults are not sensitive to the possible
endogeneity associated with the variable state ownership.
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Table 5.13: Two-stage Least Squares Regression on Ex-day Drop-off Ratios and Ex-day Abnormal Returns

This table reports estimates of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression on ex-day drop-off ratio and ex-day abnormal returns for the full
sample period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012. In the first stage, state ownership is regressed using 3-year lagged state ownership, the
company’s size, Dividend Yield and payout ratio. The second stage uses the fitted values of state ownership from the first stage as an instrumental
variable to regress on ex-day drop-off ratios and ex-day abnormal returns. The t-statistics are provided in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. The Hausman test is used to test the difference between OLS estimates and 2SLS estimates.

Intercept
Size
DY
State Ownership
Dummyif period 2
Dummyif period 3
R2
Hausman test:
H0: There is no significant difference
between OLS and 2SLS estimates

Dependent Variable: DR
0.135
(0.05)
–0.231*
(–1.87)
0.473
(0.51)
2.748***
(3.02)
0.145
(0.79)
0.249
(0.93)
15.47%

Dependent Variable: ABRET
0.075
(1.05)
0.017*
(1.93)
0.007
(0.98)
–0.075**
(2.03)
0.091
(0.74)
0.001
(0.97)
11.78%

 2 = 3.16

 2 = 1.07
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Table 5.14: Two-stage Least Squares Regression on Abnormal Volumes

This table reports estimates of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression on cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) for the full sample period
from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012. In the first stage, state ownership is regressed using 3-year lagged state ownership, the company’s size,
Dividend Yield and payout ratio. The second stage uses the fitted values of state ownership from the first stage as an instrumental variable to regress
on ex-day drop-off ratios and ex-day abnormal returns. The t-statistics are provided in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the
10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. The Hausman test is used to test the difference between OLS estimates and 2SLS estimates.

Intercept
Size
DY
Beta
1/Pcum
State Ownership
Dummyif period 2
Dummyif period 3
R2
Hausman test:
H0: There is no significant difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates
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Dependent Variable: CAV
1.563
(0.75)
–0.073
(–0.57)
25.193***
(2.95)
–0.756
(–1.27)
–50,742***
(–3.78)
2.056
(1.13)
–1.795*
(–1.89)
–0.781
(–0.97)
17.93%

 2 =1.53

5.3.2. Sub-sample Division
In this section, to confirm whether the regression results on ex-day drop-off ratios
and ex-day abnormal returns are influenced by sample selection, the sample is
divided based on the median value of state ownership into above-median state
ownership sub-sample and below-median state ownership sub-sample and
regressions are re-run accordingly. Results from Table 5.15 show that for an
increase in state ownership, drop-off ratio increases while ex-day abnormal return
decreases. This result is significant and consistent for both sub-samples, indicating
that the positive effect of state ownership on the market value of dividends is not
sensitive to sample selection. Moreover, the insignificant estimates on the two
dummy variables are also consistent with the regression results for the full sample,
implying that the market value of dividends is not affected by the change in the
relative difference between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. Altogether,
the results on how dividends value is affected by taxes and state ownership are
robust to sample selection bias.
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Table 5.15: Sub-sample Regressions on Ex-day Drop-off Ratios and Ex-day Abnormal Returns

This table reports estimates of regression on ex-day drop-off ratios and ex-day abnormal returns of the two sub-samples divided based on the median
value of state ownership of 0.3471. The sample is divided into sub-sample with above-median state ownership and sub-sample with below-median
state ownership. The t-statistics are provided in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.

Intercept
Size
DY
State Ownership
Dummyif period 2
Dummyif period 3
R2

Dependent Variable: DR
Sub-sample with above-median Sub-sample with below-median
state ownership
state ownership
***
–4.988
2.187
(–2.66)
(1.22)
0.066
–0.084
(1.02)
(–1.28)
*
5.589
–1.644
(2.88)
(–0.58)
***
8.234
3.233***
(10.69)
(4.41)
0.146
0.031
(0.64)
(0.17)
0.016
0.255
(0.07)
(1.23)
14.49%
2.92%
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Dependent Variable: ABRET
Sub-sample with above-median
Sub-sample with below-median
state ownership
state ownership
**
0.063
–0.145***
(2.26)
(–2.67)
0.001
0.004**
(0.50)
(2.32)
–0.042
0.072
(–1.01)
(1.09)
***
–0.149
–0.036***
(–13.97)
(–6.86)
–0.024
0.027
(–1.23)
(1.12)
–0.009
0.009
(–0.69)
(0.86)
17.91%
7.62%

5.4. Summary of Empirical Findings
5.4.1. Results of Hypothesis Testing
The study examines the impact of taxes and state ownership on the market value of
dividends by testing several hypotheses. The acceptance or rejection of these
hypotheses contributes to examine and explain how the market value of dividends
is affected by the difference between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate
and by the level of state ownership. Based on the results from both univariate and
multivariate analyses in previous sections, Table 5.13 provides a summary of
hypothesis testing results.
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Table 5.16: Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results
Subjects tested

Hypothesis

Result

H1: Drop-off ratios from 1 January
2006 to 30 June 2010 (Period 1) are
not different from one.

Accept

The impact of the differential
H2: Drop-off ratios from 1 July 2010
tax treatment between dividends
to 31 July 2011 (Period 2) are
and capital gains on the market
greater than one.
value of dividends
H3: Drop-off ratios from 1 August
2011 to 31 December 2012 (Period
3) are greater than one.

Reject

Reject

H4: Abnormal volumes in all three
sub-periods are greater than zero.

Accept

H5a: Abnormal trading volumes are
positively correlated to dividend
yield

Accept

The presence of short-term H5 : Abnormal trading volumes are
b
trading
negatively correlated to transaction
costs.

Accept

H6: Abnormal returns are positive
before the ex-days and negative on
and after the ex-days.

Accept

The impact of the differential
tax treatment between dividends H7: Abnormal trading volumes are
and capital gains on short-term higher after 1 July 2010.
trading

Reject

The impact of state ownership H8: There is a relationship between
on the market value of state ownership and the market value
dividends
of dividends.

Accept

5.4.2. The Impact of Taxes on the Market Value of Dividends
The study finds evidence consistent with the tax-based explanation of the ex-day
price behaviour in the Vietnamese market during the period of no tax on either
dividends or capital gains. In that period, the ex-day stock price drop is found to be
not significantly different from one. Nonetheless, the study does not find the
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difference between the tax rates on dividends and on capital gains to significantly
affect the market value of dividends of stocks as tested using measures of both the
ex-day drop-off ratios and the ex-day abnormal returns. The main findings are as
follows. First, during the period where dividends are tax advantaged relative to
capital gains, drop-off ratios are not found to be greater than one (rejection of H2
and H3). Moreover, regression estimates confirm that even though tax rates on
dividends and capital gains vary over the three periods, the ex-day drop-off ratios
and the ex-day abnormal returns do not significantly respond to tax changes.
Altogether, this study does not lend full support to the tax hypothesis. One possible
explanation as to why the gap between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate
does not significantly affect the market value of dividends on the HOSE is the
presence of short-term trading around the ex-days. The simultaneous acceptance of
Hypotheses H4, H5 and H6 and the rejection of Hypothesis H7 is consistent with
the notion of short-term traders trading abnormally around the ex-days. This is
further supported by evidence of the ex-day behaviour significantly affected by
transaction costs and dividend yields but unaffected by the differential tax treatment
between dividends and capital gains.
5.4.3. The Impact of State Ownership on the Market Value of Dividends
Results from univariate analysis and regression analysis both accept Hypothesis H8
that there is a relationship between state ownership and the market value of
dividends. Drop-off ratios are higher for stocks with higher state ownership. On the
other hand, the ex-day abnormal returns are lower when state ownership is higher.
Both indicate that the market value of dividends is positively correlated with the
level of shares held by the State.
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5.4.4. Ownership Structure as a Moderating Factor in Explaining the Impact
of Taxes on the Market Value of Dividends
State ownership is shown to not only significantly affect the market value of
dividends but also act as a moderating factor in explaining how dividends are valued
against capital gains using the tax hypothesis. When the sample is divided based on
high, medium and low state ownership and compare drop-off ratios accordingly,
Hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 are accepted within the sub-sample of high state
ownership, but not within the sub-sample of medium or low state ownership. This
result indicates that, in the Vietnamese market, the difference between the tax rates
on dividends and on capital gains only affects the market value of dividends of
stocks with a high level of state ownership. Further analysis on abnormal volumes
and abnormal return provides an explanation to this phenomenon. The insignificant
abnormal trading volumes and abnormal returns on most of the days around the exdays of stocks with high state ownership suggest that investors holding high-stateowned stocks do not trade abnormally around the ex-days. Moreover, trading in
stocks with high state ownership is found not to be significantly driven by
transaction costs. For stocks with medium and low state ownership, the study
provides evidence consistent with the presence of dividend capture around the exdays. Evidence of significant abnormal volumes combined with positive abnormal
returns before and negative abnormal returns after the ex-days supports the shortterm trading hypothesis. More importantly, the trading around the ex-days in stocks
with medium and low state ownership is significantly influenced by the level of
transaction costs.
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This study presents evidence consistent with insights provided by Elton and Gruber
(1970). Viewing investors who trade in stocks with high state ownership as longterm investors, they would tend to consider transaction costs as fixed and therefore
less important. It follows that under the presence of long-term investors, the ex-day
price and the market value of dividends are more likely to be affected by the
difference between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. On the other hand,
when state ownership is relatively lower, the impact of the difference between
dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate on the value of dividends is more likely
to be lessened if short-term traders are dominant around the ex-days. The results
found in this study are consistent with the above.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

6.1. Main Contents of the Thesis
This thesis investigates how the market value of dividends in the Vietnamese
market is affected by taxes and state ownership for the period 2006–2012. The
market value of dividends is examined through the ex-day drop-off ratios of the
stocks with a higher drop-off ratio indicating a higher market value of dividends.
The impact of taxes on the market value of dividends is examined based on how the
ex-day drop-off ratios change following a change in the relative difference between
the tax rate on dividends and on capital gains. The comparison of the ex-day dropoff ratios at different levels of state ownership is employed to evaluate how state
ownership affects the market value of dividends. In addition to the Introduction
and Conclusion Chapter, the thesis comprises of four main chapters of which
contents are summarized as follows.
Chapter two: Literature Review presents a theoretical framework where the
concept of dividend value is derived. The chapter starts with the dividend
irrelevance theory by Miller and Modigliani (1961) which proposes that dividend
policy does not affect the firm’s value assuming that there are no market frictions
such as taxes, transaction costs, information asymmetry, and agency costs.
Dividend irrelevance theory supports the notion that dividend policies do not affect
dividend value therefore stock prices on the ex-dividend day should drop by
approximately the amount of dividends (Campbell and Beraneck, 1955). The two
competing theories challenge the dividend irrelevance theory and propose that
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dividend policy does affect the firm’s value. The bird-in-the-hand hypothesis argues
that investors prefer sure dividends to fluctuating capital gains. In contrast, the tax
preference theory argues that capital gains are preferred to dividends due to
dividends being taxed at a higher rate than capital gains.
Chapter two also discusses relevant studies on factors that might affect the market
value of dividends. First, Elton and Gruber (1970) propose the tax hypothesis which
argues that the higher tax rate on dividends than on capital gains causes dividends
to be discounted in value against capital gains. Evidence in support of the tax
hypothesis includes an equal-to-one drop-off ratio when dividends and capital gains
are equally taxed (Barclay, 1987; Milonas et al., 2006); a lower-than-one drop-off
ratio when dividends are more heavily taxed than capital gains (Bell and Jenkinson,
2002; Elton and Gruber, 1970; Lasfer and Zenonos, 2003); a higher-than-one dropoff ratio when dividends are tax advantaged compared to capital gains (Elton et al.,
2005; Green and Rydqvist, 1999) and an increase in drop-off ratio when the gap
between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate is reduced (Lasfer, 1995;
Francis et al., 2012). Second, Kalay (1982) argues that the manner in which
dividends are valued against capital gains depends on the level of transaction costs
incurred by short-term investors around the ex-days. Lakonishok and Vermaelen
(1986), Karpoff and Walkling (1990) and Athanassakos (1996) provide evidence to
support Kalay’s view when they find significant abnormal trading volumes around
the ex-days with positive abnormal returns before and negative abnormal returns
after the ex-days. Third, Michaely and Vila (1995) propose that the level of tax
heterogeneity among investors is an important determinant of the ex-day trading
pattern and the market value of dividends. Finally, market microstructure
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explanations interpret the ex-day price behaviour based on price discreteness, bidask bounce and limit order adjustments. The key argument by supporters of the
market microstructure explanations is that even in the absence of taxes and
transaction costs, stock price on the ex-days is unlikely to fall by the exact amount
of dividend due to market microstructure factors such as price discreteness, bid-ask
bounce and limit order adjustments.
Chapter three: Institutional Settings of the Vietnamese Market provides
institutional conditions of the Vietnamese market. The tax mechanism in Vietnam
is featured by flat tax rates on both dividends and capital gains. On the other hand,
the tax rates have never been higher on dividends than on capital gains. This chapter
also discusses the equitisation process in Vietnam since many of the companies on
the HOSE which is the focus of this study are former SOEs and are equitised
through the equitisation process.
Chapter four: Hypotheses, Data and Methods discusses data, methods and
hypotheses of the study. The sample used includes 265 dividend paying firms on
the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange during the period from 1 January 2006 to 31
December 2012. A total of eight hypotheses are proposed to examine the impact of
taxes and state ownership on the market value of dividends. In testing these
hypotheses, both univariate and regression techniques are employed.

Chapter five: Empirical Findings presents the empirical results on drop-off ratios,
abnormal volumes and abnormal returns to assist the hypothesis testing procedure
using both univariate and regression analysis. Chapter five also concludes about the
impact of taxes and state ownership on the market value of dividends in the
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Vietnamese market and how state ownership can act as a moderating factor in
explaining the ex-day stock price behaviour from a tax-based perspective.
6.2. Summary of Empirical Findings
6.2.1. The Impact of Taxes on the Market Value of Dividends
By testing different hypotheses on how the ex-day drop-off ratios change following
the variations on dividends and capital gains tax rate, the study finds that the exday drop-off ratios, therefore the value of dividends, do not significantly increase
when dividends become more tax advantaged compared to capital gains.
Hypothesis H1 is not rejected, meaning that the ex-day drop-off ratios are not
statistically different from one when there was no tax on either dividends or on
capital gains which is consistent with the tax-based explanation of the ex-day price
behaviour; however, both Hypothesis H2 and H3 that the ex-day drop-off ratios are
greater than one when dividends were taxed at a lower rate than capital gains are
rejected. Altogether, this study does not lend full support to the tax hypothesis.
H1: Drop-off ratios from 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010 (Period 1) are not
different from one.
H2: Drop-off ratios from 1 July 2010 to 31 July 2011 (Period 2) are greater than
one.
H3: Drop-off ratios from 1 August 2011 to 31 December 2012 (Period 3) are
greater than one.
The results from regression analysis show that the ex-day drop-off ratios and the
ex-day abnormal returns in Period 2 and Period 3 where dividends were taxed at a
lower rate than capital gains are not statistically different from the corresponding
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values obtained from Period 1 where dividends and capital gains were equally
taxed. These results, together with the rejection of Hypothesis H2 and H3, suggest
that the relative difference between the tax rate on dividends and on capital gains
does not significantly affect the market value of dividends. This is consistent with
some previous studies that find dividends and capital gains tax rate to be
uncorrelated with the ex-day drop-off ratios. For example, Michaely (1991) finds
no change in the ex-day drop-off ratios in the US market when the differential tax
treatment between dividends and capital gains was removed. In a similar manner,
Daunfeldt (2002) provides evidence against the tax hypothesis in Sweden when he
reports no change in the ex-day drop-off ratios following substantial changes in the
tax policy.
This study also examines trading volumes to detect the presence of short-term
trading in the Vietnamese market and accepts the following hypotheses:
H4: Abnormal volumes in all three sub-periods are greater than zero.
H5a: Abnormal trading volumes are positively correlated to dividend yield.
H5b: Abnormal trading volumes are negatively correlated to transaction costs.
H6: Abnormal returns are positive before the ex-days and negative on and after the
ex-days.
The simultaneous acceptance of Hypotheses H4, H5a, H5b and H6 supports that
short-term traders are active around the ex-days. Consistent with the arguments by
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), short-term trading on the HOSE is concentrated
on high-yielding stocks and abnormal trading volumes are more pronounced when
transaction cost is low. Furthermore, abnormal return is found to be consistently
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positive before the ex-days and negative on and after the ex-days, suggesting that
investors are executing dividend capture (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986; Lasfer,
1995). In literature, dividend capture has also been found to be present in markets
such as the NASDAQ (Karpoff and Walkling, 1998) and the Canadian market
(Athanassakos and Fowler, 1993). Altogether, the ex-day behaviour in the
Vietnamese market is significantly affected by transaction costs and dividend yields
but unaffected by the differential tax treatment between dividends and capital gains.
The study also shows that the tax heterogeneity does not significantly affect the
short-term trading activities of investors in the Vietnamese market and rejects the
following hypothesis H7. According to Michaely and Vila (1995), if tax is taken
into consideration by short-term traders on the HOSE, the case of dividends taxadvantaged relative to capital gains would lead to an increased level of abnormal
trading volumes compared to the case when dividends and capital gains are equally
taxed. This prediction was not supported in this study.
H7: Abnormal trading volumes are higher after 1 July 2010.
6.2.2. The Impact of State Ownership on the Market Value of Dividends
In this study, state ownership is found to significantly affect the market value of
dividends. Dividends paid from companies with a higher state ownership are more
valuable than dividends from companies with a lower state ownership. The study
accepts the following hypothesis:
H8: There is a relationship between state ownership and the market value of
dividends.
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The finding of state ownership significantly affecting the market value of dividends
adds to existing factors that might explain how dividends are valued. M&M (1961)
argue that dividend clienteles are formed by investors’ ages and that the dividend
value of low-yield stocks is higher for young investors. Frank and Jagannathan
(1998) attribute the nuisance of handling with dividends as what makes dividends
less valuable for investors. On the other hand, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) propose
that self-control drives investors to prefer cash dividends rather than income from
capital gains.
6.2.3. Ownership Structure as a Moderating Factor in Explaining the Impact
of Taxes on the Market Value of Dividends
In examining the impact of taxes and state ownership on the market value of
dividends, the study also finds that ownership structure can act as a moderating
factor in explaining the impact of taxes. The key finding is that the differential tax
treatment between dividends and capital gains has an effect on the dividend value
of stocks with a high level of state ownership. This was not the case for stocks with
medium or low state ownership. Nonetheless, this presents evidence consistent with
insights provided by Elton and Gruber (1970). Viewing investors who trade in
stocks with high state ownership as long-term investors would tend to consider
transaction costs as fixed and therefore less important. It follows that under the
presence of long-term investors, the ex-day price and the market value of dividends
are more likely to be affected by the difference between dividends tax rate and
capital gains tax rate. On the other hand, when state ownership is relatively lower,
the impact of the difference between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate on
the value of dividends is more likely to be lessened if short-term traders are
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dominant around the ex-days. The results found in this study are consistent with the
above.
6.3. Research Implications
6.3.1. To Board of Directors
The empirical evidence from this study supports the relevance of dividend policy
in the Vietnamese market. The study documents that dividend policy in the
Vietnamese market affects firm value. Investors are found to value dividends and
capital gains unequally at different levels of state ownership. Dividends are valued
more than capital gains in companies with high a level of state ownership (the case
when the State holds more than 50 percent of the total number of outstanding
shares). However, dividends are less valuable in companies with medium state
ownership (the case when the State holds between 20 percent and 50 percent of the
total number of outstanding shares) and low state ownership (the case when the
State holds less than 20 percent of the total number of outstanding shares). This
finding provides the board of directors with some insights into the optimal dividend
policy of companies with varying levels of state ownership. According to the results
documented in this study, it would be most desirable for companies with high state
ownership to set a high target payout ratio while companies with medium and low
state ownership should keep a minimum payout ratio and retain funds for growth
and expansion in order to maximise the value of the firm.
6.3.2. To Regulators
In Vietnam, short-term trading is believed to help boost capital velocity, increase
trading volume and improve stock liquidity but create market instability
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(VnEconomy, 2011). The responsiveness of short-term trading to tax changes
suggests that taxes can be an influential tool for regulators to control short-term
trading. It is found that when no tax on either dividends or capital gains moved to a
five percent tax rate on dividends and a 20 percent tax rate on capital gains, the
level of trading volume dropped significantly. This was followed by an increase in
trading volume when dividends tax was removed and the 20 percent capital gains
tax rate was reduced to 10 percent.
6.3.3. To Investors
The analysis of abnormal trading volume shows significantly positive abnormal
returns before the ex-days. This implies that short-term traders in the Vietnamese
market have not fully arbitraged away profit opportunities around the ex-days.
Interestingly, the presence of positive abnormal returns was persistent only in
stocks with medium and low state ownership, not in stocks with high state
ownership. This suggests that there is still room for investors to realise excess
returns by forgoing dividends and selling stocks with medium and low state
ownership before the ex-days.
6.4. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
6.4.1. Limitations
Firstly, the thesis studies how taxes and state ownership affect the market value of
dividends in the Vietnamese market by focusing on stocks listed on the Ho Chi
Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE). HOSE is the largest stock trading centre in Vietnam
with more than 300 listed companies. Companies to be listed on the HOSE are
required to hold a minimum chartered capital of 80 billion VND. Beside the HOSE,
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there exist other stock trading centres, namely Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) and
UpCom where stocks of medium and small enterprises are traded.22 Among HOSE,
HNX and UpCom, stocks on the HOSE are considered the most liquid. Companies
listed on the HOSE are large-sized and characterised by extremely high earnings
per share (Nguyen, 2013). Due to the difference in company size and liquidity of
stocks in different stock trading centres in Vietnam, confining the sample to the
HOSE-listed stocks presents a limitation of the study since stocks of smaller
companies with less liquidity are not examined.
Secondly, this thesis measures the market value of dividends by the ex-day drop-off
ratio. In doing so, the study considered the event of cash dividends only and
excluded other possible distribution methods such as stock dividends or share
repurchases.
Finally, the thesis investigates the impact of state ownership on the market value of
dividends. Other types of ownership such as managerial or foreign ownership have
been left unattended.
6.4.2. Suggestions for Future Research
Results from this thesis provide several directions for future research. First, a
further study about the relation between state ownership and information
asymmetry in the Vietnamese market is recommended. In this study, a higher
market value of dividends is found at a higher level of state ownership. The possible
explanation provided is based on the negative correlation between state ownership
and information asymmetry which is documented by Choi, Sami and Zhou (2010)

22

The requirement on chartered capital of HNX and UpCom is 10 billion VND.
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in China. A study of state ownership and information asymmetry in Vietnam is
expected to provide a more insightful explanation to the finding of this thesis.
Secondly, the study might be expanded to examine the effect of other ownership
types such as managerial and foreign ownership on the market value of dividends
to better understand how dividend policy affects the firm value under a different
ownership structure of Vietnamese companies.
Finally, the comparison of the market value of cash dividends and stock dividends
would be worthy of future investigation. Such comparison would allow us to
examine which distribution method is favoured by investors under the given tax
mechanism.
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Appendix A: Order Matching on the HOSE

Stock price on the HOSE is determined by matching buy orders and sell orders
using periodic order matching and continuous order matching. In matching order,
buy orders at higher prices and sell orders at lower prices will take precedence. In
case buy or sell orders are placed at the same price, these which entered into the
trading system earlier will take precedence in execution. In placing orders, investors
can choose limited order, market order, at-the-opening order or at-the-closing order.
Limited order is the buying or selling order at a specific or better price level. Market
order is the buying order at the lowest selling price level or the selling order at the
highest buying price level. At-the-opening order is the buying or selling order at
the opening price while at-the-closing order is the buying or selling order at the
closing price.
Periodic order matching is made on the basis of comparing buy orders and sell
orders of stocks at a specific point of time. Periodic order matching is used to
determine the opening price and the closing price of a stock for a given trading
session. The executed price under periodic order matching will be the one that
allows the highest trading quantity. Example 1.1 below illustrates how closing price
of a stock can be determined using periodic order matching.
Example 1.1. Suppose 8 investors A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H place buy/sell order of
stock X with price and quantity as follows. Investor’s names are given in
parentheses.
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Buy order

Sell order

Price

Quantity

Price

Quantity

ATC
13.9
13.8
13.7

10,000 (A)
5,000 (B)
8,000 (C)
7,000 (D)

ATC
13.8
13.9
14.0

5,000 (E)
4,000 (F)
9,000 (G)
20,000 (H)

Given that buy orders at a higher price and sell orders at a lower price will take
precedence, the table that follows presents the total quantity of stock X that can be
executed at each price:
Total buying
quantity

Buyer

Price

Seller

Total selling
quantity

Order
matched

10,000

10,000 (A)

14.0

20,000 (H)

38,000

10,000

15,000

5,000 (B)

13.9

9,000 (G)

18,000

15,000

23,000

8,000 (C)

13.8

4,000 (F)

9,000

8,000

30,000

7,000 (D)

13.7

5,000 (E)

5,000

5,000

The closing price of stock X using the periodic order matching method will be 13.9
since at that price the total executed quantity will be the largest at 15,000 units.
Continuous order matching is the trading method that the trading system applies
based on the compare-and-match basis for buying and selling orders once orders
are entered into the trading system. Continuous order matching allows immediate
price formation and transaction once the orders are entered into the system. In
determining the stock price using continuous order matching, orders with the best
prices are given priority. If two or more orders at the same price are placed, the first
entered to the system will be executed first. If the ask prices are lower than the bid
prices which mean orders can be matched, the executed price depends on which
order is placed first. Example 1.2 below illustrates how the price of a stock can be
determined using continuous order matching.
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Example 1.2. Suppose 3 investors A, B, C place buy/sell order of stock Y with price
and quantity as follows. Investor’s names are given in parentheses.
Buy order

Sell order

Price

Quantity

Price

Quantity

20

500 (A)

17

1,000 (C)

21

500 (B)

- If order by C is placed first, followed by A and B, the executed price will be 17.
- If order by A is placed first, followed by B and then C, the executed price will be
20 and 21.
- If order by A is placed first, followed by C and then A, the executed price will be
20 and 17.
- If order by B is ordered first, followed by C and then A, the executed price will be
21 and 17.
- If order by B is ordered first, followed by A and then C, the executed price will be
21 and 20.
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Appendix B: Tests for Heteroskedasticity

B.1. DRi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t + β3 Dummy if period 1 +
+ β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε
White’s test

Breusch-Pagan test

Chisq

Pr > Chisq

Chisq

Pr > Chisq

Full sample

84.83

< 0.001

34.69

< 0.001

High state ownership

72.86

< 0.001

19.59

< 0.001

Medium state ownership

157.2

< 0.001

11.59

0.041

Low state ownership

68.65

< 0.001

29.00

< 0.001

B.2. ABRETi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t +
+ β3 Dummy if period 1 + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε
White’s test

Breusch-Pagan test

Chisq

Pr > Chisq

Chisq

Pr > Chisq

Full sample

107.4

< 0.001

62.31

< 0.001

High state ownership

34.21

0.0079

6.94

0.2253

Medium state ownership

144.3

< 0.001

38.42

< 0.001

Low state ownership

47.28

< 0.001

39.81

< 0.001

B.3. CAVi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 Betai,t + β3 1/Pcum i,t +
+ β4 State Ownershipi,t + β5 Dummyif period 2 + β6 Dummy if period 3 + ε
White’s test

Breusch-Pagan test

Chisq

Pr > Chisq

Chisq

Pr > Chisq

Full sample

144.3

< 0.001

38.42

< 0.001

High state ownership

55.37

0.063

15.77

0.0273

Medium state ownership

5.09

1.000

1.61

0.9784

Low state ownership

78.94

< 0.001

15.49

0.0302
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Appendix C: Tests for Autocorrelation
C.1. DRi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t + β3 Dummy if period 1 +
+ β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε
Durbin-Watson test *

Breusch-Godfrey test

DW

Pr < DW

Pr > DW

LM

Pr > LM

Full sample

0.206

< 0.001

1.000

67.832

< 0.001

High state ownership

0.985

< 0.001

1.000

118.207

< 0.001

Medium state ownership

1.136

< 0.001

1.000

32.352

< 0.001

Low state ownership

0.956

< 0.001

1.000

80.786

< 0.001

C.2. ABRETi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t +
+ β3 Dummy if period 1 + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε
Durbin-Watson test

Breusch-Godfrey test

DW

Pr < DW

Pr > DW

LM

Pr > LM

Full sample

0.095

< 0.001

1.000

119.484

< 0.001

High state ownership

0.893

< 0.001

1.000

134.084

< 0.001

Medium state ownership

0.184

< 0.001

1.000

372.757

< 0.001

Low state ownership

0.915

< 0.001

1.000

151.742

< 0.001

C.3. CAVi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 Betai,t + β3 1/Pcum i,t +
+ β4 State Ownershipi,t + β5 Dummyif period 2 + β6 Dummy if period 3 + ε
Durbin-Watson test

Breusch-Godfrey test

DW

Pr < DW

Pr > DW

LM

Pr > LM

Full sample

1.2878

< 0.001

1.000

39.022

< 0.001

High state ownership

1.5649

< 0.001

0.999

8.777

0.0031

Medium state ownership

1.607

0.0007

0.999

7.250

0.0071

Low state ownership

0.9244

< 0.001

1.000

77.240

<0.001

*:

Pr < DW is the p-value for testing positive correlation, Pr > DW is the p-value for testing negative
correlation.
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Appendix D: Hausman Test for Random Effects

D.1. DRi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t + β3 Dummy if period 1 +
+ β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε
m

Pr > m

Full sample

12.99

0.0235

High state ownership

18.03

0.0029

Medium state ownership

11.00

0.0514

Low state ownership

43.71

< 0.001

D.2. ABRETi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t +
+ β3 Dummy if period 1 + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε
m

Pr > m

Full sample

11.98

0.0351

High state ownership

10.44

0.0636

Medium state ownership

48.74

< 0.001

Low state ownership

14.47

0.0129

D.3. CAVi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 Betai,t + β3 1/Pcum i,t +
+ β4 State Ownershipi,t + β5 Dummyif period 2 + β6 Dummy if period 3 + ε
m

Pr > m

Full sample

8.87

0.1809

High state ownership

8.95

0.1766

Medium state ownership

5.32

0.5040

Low state ownership

19.62

0.0032

129

